CIA

DisclosureHub: Liar Gaga, Child Groomer Mind War and the Transexual Ministry of Satan --- LADY GAGA - CHILD GROOMER FOR THE RICH AND POWERFUL --- The rich and powerful of this world that are involved in pedophilia or satanic practices need a constant supply of children for their blood rituals and for their consumption of adrenochrome, a chemical produced in the human body used in Hollywood and politics to stay young. But first the children must be broken spiritually, and that's where this liar and child groomer comes in. --- Adrenochrome in Hollywood https://steverotter.com/adrenochrome-in-hollywood-and-politics/ --- Lady Gaga & Co – The Global Pedophile Ring Exposed https://anonhq.com/global-pedophile/ --- FAIR USE FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES --- Mirrored From: https://conspyre.tv/channel/DisclosureHubFilms

In 2012, Lady Gaga dressed up like a witch and visited Julian Assange to allegedly support and interview him. She spent five hours asking him questions, at times coming off condescending, and appeared to be in a drug and/or mind control induced haze. She most likely was used as a Deep State asset, like a good little MKULTRA slave, to run an op and cast spells on him. Her witch costume was not an accident, she’s mocking him. “You may be an enemy of the state but you are not an enemy of humanity," Gaga told him at the time. However, her advocacy for him though seemed to begin and end there. Whatever kind of honeytrap she was attempting to run on Assange, he certainly got the last laugh. In 2016, Wikileaks released the Podesta E-malls exposing Gaga’s pal Marina Abramovic and her Satanic spirit cooking dinners. Then in 2017 the documentary film Risk came out featuring footage provided by Wikileaks of Gaga dressed up as a witch interviewing Assange. We put Gaga and her involvement with cannibal-themed Satanic spirit cooking ritual dinners on blast in Out of Shadows and since then, hundreds of millions of people around the world now know what a little monster the pop star really is.👇🏻 The truth and God shall not be mocked. https://x.com/LizCrokin/status/1806123436017684919

LADY GAGA, THE SUPER BOWL, SATANIC SPIRIT COOKING AND CHILD SACRIFICE.....so many people are exposing this. God help us

From US Army 4th PsyOp Group "All the worlds a stage" Song: "Last Goodbye" by Eric Kinny (feat. Danica Dora) Cartoon: Betty Boop Snow White (1933) 0:25 image Beijing, Commentary of Tianmen Square protests in 1989 (could not find original source) 0:29 Berlin (synagogue at left, Alexanderturm straight ahead) "Tear down this wall!", Ronald Reagan on June 12th 1987 in Berlin at the Brandenburger Tor 0:38 USSR weighted chess pieces from the 1950s 0:41 generic pine forest in northern hemisphere (maybe Brandenburg/Germany?) 0:48 Ghost Army insignia 0:56 Berlin subway 1:00 city in USA (probably New York City with those water towers on the roofs) 1:04 Louisiana (actually, no idea) 1:09 military parade in Beijing, October 1st 2019 1:15 probably Parade in USSR 1:18 Times Square news ticker with CGI 2022 headlines (reflections do not match) 1:37 Ferguson 3210 reel tape recorder 1:38 The Big Picture Episode 206 - Truth is our defense (voice Carl Zimmerman) 1:49 BOLEX 18-5 L Super projector 1:52 colors of Russian flag? 1:58 Electro Voice 635 microphone 1:59 very fake evensdropping studio with vitange equipment and modern 27" monitor 2:02 oil/acrylic color? Too thick paint for asian calligraphy, also western style brush 2:04 most probably reference to operation Mincemeat at the Spanish coast 2:10 Dome of Rock (Jordan) on photo in background 2:39 Berlin subway, station "Stadtmitte" at 6.46 (probably a.m.) 2:54 riotpolice Euromaidan Ukraine 2014 (Alpha Bank in background) 3:00 Place de la Kasbah, Tunis December 2010/January 2011 3:02 Berlin wall November 1989 3:03 task force La Fayette leaflet drop Kapisa province Afghanistan 2010 3:05 protesters Hong Kong 2019/2020 3:06 riot police in Hong Kong in front of Legislative Council in 2019 3:09 Euromaidan Ukraine 2014 3:13 Ghost Army tipping over inflatable tank in WWII 3:14 Tian’anmen square June 4th, 1989 3:16 see 3:20 3:19 Berlin wall November 1989 in front of Brandenburger Tor 3:20 Firdos Square, Bagdad, Iraq, toppling of Saddam statue on April 9th, 2003 3:21 capture of Ghaddafi on October 20th, 2011 Source Video: https://rumble.com/v27qmwa-ghosts-in-the-machine.html ................... Related Links: COVID-19 Mass Formation Psychosis https://sunfellow.com/covid-19-mass-formation-psychosis/ Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. - How "The Power Of Trusted Authorities" Was Used To Subvert America https://rumble.com/v26q8yg-robert-f.-kennedy-jr.-how-the-power-of-trusted-authorities-was-used-to-subv.html They Live, The COVID Propaganda Version https://rumble.com/v26w4qw-they-live-the-covid-propaganda-version.html COVID-19 Charlatans https://rumble.com/v1gf47n-covid-19-charlatans.html COVID Vaccine Madness (Commercials, Music Videos, Press Conferences, News Reports) https://rumble.com/v24obco-covid-vaccine-madness-commercials-music-videos-press-conferences-news-repor.html Face Mask Madness https://rumble.com/v20ca44-face-mask-madness-by-sunfellowcovid19-on-rumble.html ................... The best of the best of the best COVID-19 resources, videos, and memes: Resources: https://sunfellow.com/top-covid-19-resources/ Videos: https://rumble.com/c/SunfellowCovid19 Memes: https://sunfellow.com/the-lighter-side-of-covid-19/

More CIA stories from John Stockwell: https://thememoryhole.substack.com/ The video "Reagan and Iran: Uncovering a Covert Action" features John Stockwell, a former CIA official, delving into Reagan's clandestine arms dealings with Iran. Drawing from his experience managing a similar scenario in Angola during his tenure at the CIA, Stockwell offers profound insights into the inner workings of the CIA and the National Security Council. He highlights parallels between the "Israeli connection" in the Iran situation and his past involvement in the Angolan operation. Stockwell contextualizes these covert actions within the expansive global arms industry, estimating its annual worth at a staggering $900 billion. He critically evaluates the disinformation campaigns orchestrated by the CIA and the Reagan administration in recent years. Additionally, he scrutinizes the media coverage surrounding these covert activities. Drawing from his recent visit to Nicaragua, Stockwell shares his firsthand observations on the state of the embattled country. The video, recorded on November 26, 1986, presents a comprehensive analysis of covert operations, arms trade, media coverage, and the geopolitical landscape during that period. The Iran–Contra affair (Persian: ماجرای ایران-کنترا; Spanish: Caso Irán-Contra), often referred to as the Iran–Contra scandal, was a political scandal in the United States that occurred during the second term of the Reagan administration. Between 1981 and 1986, senior administration officials secretly facilitated the illegal sale of arms to Iran, who was subjected to an arms embargo at the time.[1] The administration hoped to use the proceeds of the arms sale to fund the Contras, an anti-Sandinista rebel group in Nicaragua. Under the Boland Amendment, further funding of the Contras by legislative appropriations was prohibited by Congress, but the Reagan administration figured out a loophole by secretively using non-appropriated funds instead. The Iran–Contra affair is sometimes referred to as the McFarlane affair in Iran. The official justification for the arms shipments was that they were part of an operation to free seven US hostages being held in Lebanon by Hezbollah, an Islamist paramilitary group with Iranian ties connected to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.[2] The idea to exchange arms for hostages was proposed by Manucher Ghorbanifar, an expatriate Iranian arms dealer.[3][4][5] Some within the Reagan administration hoped the sales would influence Iran to get Hezbollah to release the hostages. In late 1985, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North of the National Security Council (NSC) diverted a portion of the proceeds from the Iranian weapon sales to fund the Contras, a group of anti-Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) rebels, in their insurgency against the socialist government of Nicaragua. North later claimed that Ghorbanifar had given him the idea for diverting profits from BGM-71 TOW and MIM-23 Hawk missile sales to Iran to the Nicaraguan Contras.[6] While President Ronald Reagan was a vocal supporter of the Contra cause,[7] the evidence is disputed as to whether he personally authorized the diversion of funds to the Contras.[2] Handwritten notes taken by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger on 7 December 1985 indicate that Reagan was aware of potential hostage transfers with Iran, by Israel, as well as the sale of Hawk and TOW missiles to "moderate elements" within that country.[8] Weinberger wrote that Reagan said "he could answer charges of illegality but he couldn't answer charge [sic] that 'big strong President Reagan passed up a chance to free hostages.'"[8] After the weapon sales were revealed in November 1986, Reagan appeared on national television and stated that the weapons transfers had indeed occurred, but that the US did not trade arms for hostages.[9] The investigation was impeded when large volumes of documents relating to the affair were destroyed or withheld from investigators by Reagan administration officials.[10] On 4 March 1987, Reagan made a further nationally televised address, saying he was taking full responsibility for the affair and stating that "what began as a strategic opening to Iran deteriorated, in its implementation, into trading arms for hostages."[11] The affair was investigated by Congress and by the three-person, Reagan-appointed Tower Commission. Neither investigation found evidence that President Reagan himself knew of the extent of the multiple programs.[2] Additionally, US Deputy Attorney General Lawrence Walsh was appointed Independent Counsel in December 1986 to investigate possible criminal actions by officials involved in the scheme. In the end, several dozen administration officials were indicted, including then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. Eleven convictions resulted, some of which were vacated on appeal.[12] The rest of those indicted or convicted were all pardoned in the final days of the presidency of George H. W. Bush, who had been vice president at the time of the affair.[13] Former Independent Counsel Walsh noted that, in issuing the pardons, Bush appeared to have been preempting being implicated himself by evidence that came to light during the Weinberger trial and noted that there was a pattern of "deception and obstruction" by Bush, Weinberger, and other senior Reagan administration officials.[14] Walsh submitted his final report on 4 August 1993[15] and later wrote an account of his experiences as counsel, Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up.[14] Background The US was the largest seller of arms to Iran under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and the vast majority of the weapons that the Islamic Republic of Iran inherited in January 1979 were US-made.[16] To maintain this arsenal, Iran required a steady supply of spare parts to replace those broken and worn out. After Iranian students stormed the US embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and took 52 Americans hostage, US President Jimmy Carter imposed an arms embargo on Iran.[16] After Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980, Iran desperately needed weapons and spare parts for its current weapons. After Ronald Reagan took office as president on 20 January 1981, he vowed to continue Carter's policy of blocking arms sales to Iran on the grounds that Iran supported terrorism.[16] A group of senior Reagan administration officials in the Senior Interdepartmental Group conducted a secret study on 21 July 1981 and concluded that the arms embargo was ineffective because Iran could always buy arms and spare parts for its US weapons elsewhere, while, at the same time, the arms embargo opened the door for Iran to fall into the Soviet sphere of influence as the Kremlin could sell Iran weapons if the US would not.[16] The conclusion was that the US should start selling Iran arms as soon as it was politically possible in order to keep Iran from falling into the Soviet sphere of influence.[16] At the same time, the openly declared goal of Ayatollah Khomeini to export his Islamic revolution all over the Middle East and overthrow the governments of Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the other states around the Persian Gulf led to the Americans perceiving Khomeini as a major threat to the US.[16] In the spring of 1983, the US launched Operation Staunch, a wide-ranging diplomatic effort to persuade other nations all over the world not to sell arms or spare parts for weapons to Iran.[16] This was at least part of the reason the Iran–Contra affair proved so humiliating for the US when the story first broke in November 1986 that the US itself was selling arms to Iran. At the same time that the US government was considering its options on selling arms to Iran, Contra militants based in Honduras were waging a guerrilla war to topple the FSLN revolutionary government of Nicaragua. Almost from the time he took office in 1981, a major goal of the Reagan administration was the overthrow of the left-wing Sandinista government in Nicaragua and to support the Contra rebels.[17] The Reagan administration's policy toward Nicaragua produced a major clash between the executive and legislative branches as Congress sought to limit, if not curb altogether, the ability of the White House to support the Contras.[17] Direct US funding of the Contras insurgency was made illegal through the Boland Amendment, the name given to three US legislative amendments between 1982 and 1984 aimed at limiting US government assistance to Contra militants. By 1984, funding for the Contras had run out; and, in October of that year, a total ban came into effect. The second Boland Amendment, in effect from 3 October 1984 to 3 December 1985, stated: During the fiscal year 1985 no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose of or which may have the effect of supporting directly or indirectly military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, organization, group, movement, or individual.[17] In violation of the Boland Amendment, senior officials of the Reagan administration continued to secretly arm and train the Contras and provide arms to Iran, an operation they called "the Enterprise".[18][19] Given the Contras' heavy dependence on US military and financial support, the second Boland Amendment threatened to break the Contra movement and led to President Reagan ordering in 1984 that the NSC "keep the Contras together 'body and soul'", no matter what Congress voted for.[17] A major legal debate at the center of the Iran–Contra affair concerned the question of whether the NSC was one of the "any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities" covered by the Boland Amendment. The Reagan administration argued it was not, and many in Congress argued that it was.[17] The majority of constitutional scholars have asserted the NSC did indeed fall within the purview of the second Boland Amendment, though the amendment did not mention the NSC by name.[20] The broader constitutional question at stake was the power of Congress versus the power of the presidency. The Reagan administration argued that, because the constitution assigned the right to conduct foreign policy to the executive, its efforts to overthrow the government of Nicaragua were a presidential prerogative that Congress had no right to try to halt via the Boland Amendments.[21] By contrast, Congressional leaders argued that the constitution had assigned Congress control of the budget, and Congress had every right to use that power not to fund projects like attempting to overthrow the government of Nicaragua that they disapproved of.[21] As part of the effort to circumvent the Boland Amendment, the NSC established "the Enterprise", an arms-smuggling network headed by a retired US Air Force officer turned arms dealer Richard Secord that supplied arms to the Contras. It was ostensibly a private sector operation, but in fact was controlled by the NSC.[20] To fund "the Enterprise", the Reagan administration was constantly on the look-out for funds that came from outside the US government in order not to explicitly violate the letter of the Boland Amendment, though the efforts to find alternative funding for the Contras violated the spirit of the Boland Amendment.[22] Ironically, military aid to the Contras was reinstated with Congressional consent in October 1986, a month before the scandal broke.[23][24] In his 1995 memoir My American Journey, General Colin Powell, the US Deputy National Security Advisor, wrote that the weapons sales to Iran were used "for purposes prohibited by the elected representatives of the American people [...] in a way that avoided accountability to the President and Congress. It was wrong."[25] In 1985, Manuel Noriega offered to help the US by allowing Panama as a staging ground for operations against the FSLN and offering to train Contras in Panama, but this would later be overshadowed by the Iran–Contra affair itself.[26] At around the same time, the Soviet Bloc also engaged in arms deals with ideologically opponent buyers,[27] possibly involving some of the same players as the Iran–Contra affair.[28] In 1986, a complex operation involving East Germany's Stasi and the Danish-registered ship Pia Vesta ultimately aimed to sell Soviet arms and military vehicles to South Africa's Armscor, using various intermediaries to distance themselves from the deal. Manuel Noriega of Panama was apparently one of these intermediaries but backed out on the deal as the ship and weapons were seized at a Panamanian port.[29][30][28] The Pia Vesta led to a small controversy, as the Panama and Peru governments in 1986 accused the US and each other of being involved in the East Germany-originated shipment.[31][28] Arms sales to Iran See also: Brokers of Death arms case and Israel in the Iran–Iraq War As reported in The New York Times in 1991, "continuing allegations that Reagan campaign officials made a deal with the Iranian Government of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the fall of 1980" led to "limited investigations". However "limited", those investigations established that "Soon after taking office in 1981, the Reagan Administration secretly and abruptly changed United States policy." Secret Israeli arms sales and shipments to Iran began in that year, even as, in public, "the Reagan Administration" presented a different face, and "aggressively promoted a public campaign [...] to stop worldwide transfers of military goods to Iran". The New York Times explains: "Iran at that time was in dire need of arms and spare parts for its American-made arsenal to defend itself against Iraq, which had attacked it in September 1980", while "Israel [a US ally] was interested in keeping the war between Iran and Iraq going to ensure that these two potential enemies remained preoccupied with each other". Major General Avraham Tamir, a high-ranking Israeli Defense Ministry official in 1981, said there was an "oral agreement" to allow the sale of "spare parts" to Iran. This was based on an "understanding" with Secretary Alexander Haig (which a Haig adviser denied). This account was confirmed by a former senior US diplomat with a few modifications. The diplomat claimed that "[Ariel] Sharon violated it, and Haig backed away". A former "high-level" Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official who saw reports of arms sales to Iran by Israel in the early 1980s estimated that the total was about $2 billion a year—but also said, "The degree to which it was sanctioned I don't know."[32] On 17 June 1985, National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane wrote a National Security Decision Directive which called for the US to begin a rapprochement with the Islamic Republic of Iran.[16] The paper read: Dynamic political evolution is taking place inside Iran. Instability caused by the pressures of the Iraq-Iran war, economic deterioration and regime in-fighting create the potential for major changes inside Iran. The Soviet Union is better positioned than the U.S. to exploit and benefit from any power struggle that results in changes from the Iranian regime [...]. The U.S. should encourage Western allies and friends to help Iran meet its import requirements so as to reduce the attractiveness of Soviet assistance [...]. This includes provision of selected military equipment.[33] Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger was highly negative, writing on his copy of McFarlane's paper: "This is almost too absurd to comment on [...] like asking Qaddafi to Washington for a cozy chat."[34] Secretary of State George Shultz was also opposed, stating that having designated Iran a State Sponsor of Terrorism in January 1984, how could the US possibly sell arms to Iran?[34] Only the Director of the CIA William J. Casey supported McFarlane's plan to start selling arms to Iran.[34] In early July 1985, the historian Michael Ledeen, a consultant of National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, requested assistance from Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres for help in the sale of arms to Iran.[35] Having talked to an Israeli diplomat David Kimche and Ledeen, McFarlane learned that the Iranians were prepared to have Hezbollah release US hostages in Lebanon in exchange for Israelis shipping Iran US weapons.[34] Having been designated a State Sponsor of Terrorism since January 1984,[36] Iran was in the midst of the Iran–Iraq War and could find few Western nations willing to supply it with weapons.[citation needed] The idea behind the plan was for Israel to ship weapons through an intermediary (identified as Manucher Ghorbanifar) to the Islamic Republic as a way of aiding a supposedly moderate, politically influential faction within the regime of Ayatollah Khomeini who was believed to be seeking a rapprochement with the US; after the transaction, the US would reimburse Israel with the same weapons, while receiving monetary benefits.[37] McFarlane in a memo to Shultz and Weinberger wrote: The short term dimension concerns the seven hostages; the long term dimension involves the establishment of a private dialogue with Iranian officials on the broader relations [...]. They sought specifically the delivery from Israel of 100 TOW missiles [...].[34] The plan was discussed with President Reagan on 18 July 1985 and again on 6 August 1985.[34] Shultz at the latter meeting warned Reagan that "we were just falling into the arms-for-hostages business and we shouldn't do it".[34] The Americans believed that there was a moderate faction in the Islamic Republic headed by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the powerful speaker of the Majlis who was seen as a leading potential successor to Khomeini and who was alleged to want a rapprochement with the US.[38] The Americans believed that Rafsanjani had the power to order Hezbollah to free the US hostages and establishing a relationship with him by selling Iran arms would ultimately place Iran back within the US sphere of influence.[38] It remains unclear if Rafsanjani really wanted a rapprochement with the US or was just deceiving Reagan administration officials who were willing to believe that he was a moderate who would effect a rapprochement.[38] Rafsanjani, whose nickname is "the Shark", was described by the UK journalist Patrick Brogan as a man of great charm and formidable intelligence known for his subtlety and ruthlessness whose motives in the Iran–Contra affair remain completely mysterious.[38] The Israeli government required that the sale of arms meet high-level approval from the US government, and, when McFarlane convinced them that the US government approved the sale, Israel obliged by agreeing to sell the arms.[35] In 1985, President Reagan entered Walter Reed National Military Medical Center for colon cancer surgery. Reagan's recovery was nothing short of miserable, as the 74-year-old President admitted having little sleep for days in addition to his immense physical discomfort. While doctors seemed to be confident that the surgery was successful, the discovery of his localized cancer was a daunting realization for Reagan. From seeing the recovery process of other patients, as well as medical “experts” on television predicting his death to be soon, Reagan's typical optimistic outlook was dampened. These factors were bound to contribute to psychological distress in the midst of an already distressing situation.[39] Additionally, Reagan's invocation of the 25th Amendment prior to the surgery was a risky and unprecedented decision that smoothly flew under the radar for the duration of the complex situation. While it only lasted slightly longer than the length of the procedure (approximately seven hours and 54 minutes), this temporary transfer of power was never formally recognized by the White House. It was later revealed that this decision was made on the grounds that "Mr. Reagan and his advisors did not want his actions to establish a definition of incapacitation that would bind future presidents." Reagan expressed this transfer of power in two identical letters that were sent to the speaker of the House of Representatives, Representative Tip O'Neill, and the president pro tempore of the senate, Senator Strom Thurmond.[40] While the President was recovering in the hospital, McFarlane met with him and told him that representatives from Israel had contacted the National Security Agency to pass on confidential information from what Reagan later described as the "moderate" Iranian faction headed by Rafsanjani opposed to the Ayatollah's hardline anti-US policies.[37] The visit from McFarlane in Reagan's hospital room was the first visit from an administration official outside of Donald Regan since the surgery. The meeting took place five days after the surgery and only three days after doctors gave the news that his polyp had been malignant. The three participants of this meeting had very different recollections of what was discussed during its 23-minute duration. Months later, Reagan even stated that he "had no recollection of a meeting in the hospital in July with McFarlane and that he had no notes which would show such a meeting". This does not come as a surprise considering the possible short and long-term effects of anesthesia on patients above the age of 60, in addition to his already weakened physical and mental state.[39] According to Reagan, these Iranians sought to establish a quiet relationship with the US, before establishing formal relationships upon the death of the aging Ayatollah.[37] In Reagan's account, McFarlane told Reagan that the Iranians, to demonstrate their seriousness, offered to persuade the Hezbollah militants to release the seven US hostages.[41] McFarlane met with the Israeli intermediaries;[42] Reagan claimed that he allowed this because he believed that establishing relations with a strategically located country, and preventing the Soviet Union from doing the same, was a beneficial move.[37] Although Reagan claims that the arms sales were to a "moderate" faction of Iranians, the Walsh Iran–Contra Report states that the arms sales were "to Iran" itself,[43] which was under the control of the Ayatollah. Following the Israeli–US meeting, Israel requested permission from the US to sell a small number of BGM-71 TOW antitank missiles to Iran, claiming that this would aid the "moderate" Iranian faction,[41] by demonstrating that the group actually had high-level connections to the US government.[41] Reagan initially rejected the plan, until Israel sent information to the US showing that the "moderate" Iranians were opposed to terrorism and had fought against it.[44] Now having a reason to trust the "moderates", Reagan approved the transaction, which was meant to be between Israel and the "moderates" in Iran, with the US reimbursing Israel.[41] In his 1990 autobiography An American Life, Reagan claimed that he was deeply committed to securing the release of the hostages; it was this compassion that supposedly motivated his support for the arms initiatives. The president requested that the "moderate" Iranians do everything in their capability to free the hostages held by Hezbollah.[3] Reagan always publicly insisted after the scandal broke in late 1986 that the purpose behind the arms-for-hostages trade was to establish a working relationship with the "moderate" faction associated with Rafsanjani to facilitate the reestablishment of the US–Iranian alliance after the soon to be expected death of Khomeini, to end the Iran–Iraq War and end Iranian support for Islamic terrorism while downplaying the importance of freeing the hostages in Lebanon as a secondary issue.[45] By contrast, when testifying before the Tower Commission, Reagan declared that hostage issue was the main reason for selling arms to Iran.[46] A BGM-71 TOW antitank guided missile The following arms were supplied to Iran:[43][47] First arms sales in 1981 (see above) 20 August 1985 – 96 TOW antitank missiles 14 September 1985 – 408 more TOWs 24 November 1985 – 18 Hawk antiaircraft missiles 17 February 1986 – 500 TOWs 27 February 1986 – 500 TOWs 24 May 1986 – 508 TOWs, 240 Hawk spare parts 4 August 1986 – More Hawk spares 28 October 1986 – 500 TOWs First few arms sales The first arms sales to Iran began in 1981, though the official paper trail has them beginning in 1985 (see above). On 20 August 1985, Israel sent 96[contradictory] US-made TOW missiles to Iran through an arms dealer Manucher Ghorbanifar.[48] Subsequently, on 14 September 1985, 408 more TOW missiles were delivered. On 15 September 1985, following the second delivery, Reverend Benjamin Weir was released by his captors, the Islamic Jihad Organization. On 24 November 1985, 18 Hawk antiaircraft missiles were delivered. Modifications in plans Robert McFarlane resigned on 4 December 1985,[49][50] stating that he wanted to spend more time with his family,[51] and was replaced by Admiral John Poindexter.[52] Two days later, Reagan met with his advisors at the White House, where a new plan was introduced. This called for a slight change in the arms transactions: instead of the weapons going to the "moderate" Iranian group, they would go to "moderate" Iranian army leaders.[53] As each weapons delivery was made from Israel by air, hostages held by Hezbollah would be released.[53] Israel would continue to be reimbursed by the US for the weapons. Though staunchly opposed by Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, the plan was authorized by Reagan, who stated that, "We were not trading arms for hostages, nor were we negotiating with terrorists".[54] In his notes of a meeting held in the White House on 7 December 1985, Weinberger wrote he told Reagan that this plan was illegal, writing: I argued strongly that we have an embargo that makes arms sales to Iran illegal and President couldn't violate it and that 'washing' transactions through Israel wouldn't make it legal. Shultz, Don Regan agreed.[55] Weinberger's notes have Reagan saying he "could answer charges of illegality but he couldn't answer charge [sic] that 'big strong President Reagan passed up a chance to free hostages'."[55] Now retired National Security Advisor McFarlane flew to London to meet with Israelis and Ghorbanifar in an attempt to persuade the Iranian to use his influence to release the hostages before any arms transactions occurred; this plan was rejected by Ghorbanifar.[53] On the day of McFarlane's resignation, Oliver North, a military aide to the US National Security Council (NSC), proposed a new plan for selling arms to Iran, which included two major adjustments: instead of selling arms through Israel, the sale was to be direct at a markup; and a portion of the proceeds would go to Contras, or Nicaraguan paramilitary fighters waging guerrilla warfare against the Sandinista government, claiming power after an election full of irregularities.[56][not specific enough to verify] The dealings with the Iranians were conducted via the NSC with Admiral Poindexter and his deputy Colonel North, with the US historians Malcolm Byrne and Peter Kornbluh writing that Poindexter granted much power to North "who made the most of the situation, often deciding important matters on his own, striking outlandish deals with the Iranians, and acting in the name of the president on issues that were far beyond his competence. All of these activities continued to take place within the framework of the president's broad authorization. Until the press reported on the existence of the operation, nobody in the administration questioned the authority of Poindexter's and North's team to implement the president's decisions".[57] North proposed a $15 million markup, while contracted arms broker Ghorbanifar added a 41-percent markup of his own.[58] Other members of the NSC were in favor of North's plan; with large support, Poindexter authorized it without notifying President Reagan, and it went into effect.[59] At first, the Iranians refused to buy the arms at the inflated price because of the excessive markup imposed by North and Ghorbanifar. They eventually relented, and, in February 1986, 1,000 TOW missiles were shipped to the country.[59] From May to November 1986, there were additional shipments of miscellaneous weapons and parts.[59] Both the sale of weapons to Iran and the funding of the Contras attempted to circumvent not only stated administration policy, but also the Boland Amendment. Administration officials argued that, regardless of Congress restricting funds for the Contras, or any affair, the President (or in this case the administration) could carry on by seeking alternative means of funding such as private entities and foreign governments.[60] Funding from one foreign country, Brunei, was botched when North's secretary, Fawn Hall, transposed the numbers of North's Swiss bank account number. A Swiss businessperson, suddenly $10 million richer, alerted the authorities of the mistake. The money was eventually returned to the Sultan of Brunei, with interest.[61] On 7 January 1986, John Poindexter proposed to Reagan a modification of the approved plan: instead of negotiating with the "moderate" Iranian political group, the US would negotiate with "moderate" members of the Iranian government.[62] Poindexter told Reagan that Ghorbanifar had important connections within the Iranian government, so, with the hope of the release of the hostages, Reagan approved this plan as well.[62] Throughout February 1986, weapons were shipped directly to Iran by the US (as part of Oliver North's plan), but none of the hostages were released. Retired National Security Advisor McFarlane conducted another international voyage, this one to Tehran—bringing with him a gift of a Bible with a handwritten inscription by Ronald Reagan[63][64] and, according to George W. Cave, a cake baked in the shape of a key.[63] Howard Teicher described the cake as a joke between North and Ghorbanifar.[65] McFarlane met directly with Iranian officials associated with Rafsanjani, who sought to establish US–Iranian relations in an attempt to free the four remaining hostages.[66] The US delegation comprised McFarlane, North, Cave (a retired CIA officer who served as the group's translator), Teicher, Israeli diplomat Amiram Nir, and a CIA communicator.[67] They arrived in Tehran in an Israeli plane carrying forged Irish passports on 25 May 1986.[68] This meeting also failed. Much to McFarlane's disgust, he did not meet ministers, and instead met in his words "third and fourth level officials".[68] At one point, an angry McFarlane shouted: "As I am a Minister, I expect to meet with decision-makers. Otherwise, you can work with my staff."[68] The Iranians requested concessions such as Israel's withdrawal from the Golan Heights, which the US rejected.[66] More importantly, McFarlane refused to ship spare parts for the Hawk missiles until the Iranians had Hezbollah release the US hostages, whereas the Iranians wanted to reverse that sequence with the spare parts being shipped first before the hostages were freed.[68] The differing negotiating positions led to McFarlane's mission going home after four days.[69] After the failure of the secret visit to Tehran, McFarlane advised Reagan not to talk to the Iranians anymore, advice that was disregarded.[69] Subsequent dealings On 26 July 1986, Hezbollah freed the US hostage Father Lawrence Jenco, former head of Catholic Relief Services in Lebanon.[69] Following this, William J. Casey, head of the CIA, requested that the US authorize sending a shipment of small missile parts to Iranian military forces as a way of expressing gratitude.[70] Casey also justified this request by stating that the contact in the Iranian government might otherwise lose face or be executed, and hostages might be killed. Reagan authorized the shipment to ensure that those potential events would not occur.[70] North used this release to persuade Reagan to switch over to a "sequential" policy of freeing the hostages one by one, instead of the "all or nothing" policy that the Americans had pursued until then.[69] By this point, the Americans had grown tired of Ghorbanifar who had proven himself a dishonest intermediary who played off both sides to his own commercial advantage.[69] In August 1986, the Americans had established a new contact in the Iranian government, Ali Hashemi Bahramani, the nephew of Rafsanjani and an officer in the Revolutionary Guard.[69] The fact that the Revolutionary Guard was deeply involved in international terrorism seemed only to attract the Americans more to Bahramani, who was seen as someone with the influence to change Iran's policies.[69] Richard Secord, a US arms dealer, who was being used as a contact with Iran, wrote to North: "My judgment is that we have opened up a new and probably better channel into Iran".[69] North was so impressed with Bahramani that he arranged for him to secretly visit Washington DC and gave him a guided tour at midnight of the White House.[69] North frequently met with Bahramani in the summer and autumn of 1986 in West Germany, discussing arms sales to Iran, the freeing of hostages held by Hezbollah and how best to overthrow President Saddam Hussein of Iraq and the establishment of "a non-hostile regime in Baghdad".[69] In September and October 1986, three more Americans—Frank Reed, Joseph Cicippio, and Edward Tracy—were abducted in Lebanon by a separate terrorist group, who referred to them simply as "G.I. Joe", after the popular US toy. The reasons for their abduction are unknown, although it is speculated that they were kidnapped to replace the freed Americans.[71] One more original hostage, David Jacobsen, was later released. The captors promised to release the remaining two, but the release never happened.[72] During a secret meeting in Frankfurt in October 1986, North told Bahramani that: "Saddam Hussein must go".[69] North also claimed that Reagan had told him to tell Bahramani that: "Saddam Hussein is an asshole."[69] Behramani during a secret meeting in Mainz informed North that Rafsanjani "for his own politics [...] decided to get all the groups involved and give them a role to play".[73] Thus, all the factions in the Iranian government would be jointly responsible for the talks with the Americans and "there would not be an internal war".[73] This demand of Behramani caused much dismay on the US side as it made clear to them that they would not be dealing solely with a "moderate" faction in the Islamic Republic, as the Americans liked to pretend to themselves, but rather with all the factions in the Iranian government—including those who were very much involved in terrorism.[73] Despite this, the talks were not broken off.[73] Discovery and scandal After a leak by Mehdi Hashemi, a senior official in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Lebanese magazine Ash-Shiraa exposed the arrangement on 3 November 1986.[74] According to Seymour Hersh, an unnamed former military officer told him that the leak may have been orchestrated by a covert team led by Arthur S. Moreau Jr., assistant to the chair of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, due to fears the scheme had grown out of control.[75] This was the first public report of the weapons-for-hostages deal. The operation was discovered only after an airlift of guns (Corporate Air Services HPF821) was downed over Nicaragua. Eugene Hasenfus, who was captured by Nicaraguan authorities after surviving the plane crash, initially alleged in a press conference on Nicaraguan soil that two of his coworkers, Max Gomez and Ramon Medina, worked for the CIA.[76] He later said he did not know whether they did or not.[77] The Iranian government confirmed the Ash-Shiraa story, and, 10 days after the story was first published, President Reagan appeared on national television from the Oval Office on 13 November, stating: My purpose was [...] to send a signal that the United States was prepared to replace the animosity between [the US and Iran] with a new relationship [...]. At the same time we undertook this initiative, we made clear that Iran must oppose all forms of international terrorism as a condition of progress in our relationship. The most significant step which Iran could take, we indicated, would be to use its influence in Lebanon to secure the release of all hostages held there.[9] The scandal was compounded when Oliver North destroyed or hid pertinent documents between 21 November and 25 November 1986. During North's trial in 1989, his secretary, Fawn Hall, testified extensively about helping North alter and shred official US National Security Council (NSC) documents from the White House. According to The New York Times, enough documents were put into a government shredder to jam it.[58] Hall also testified that she smuggled classified documents out of the Old Executive Office Building by concealing them in her boots and dress.[78] North's explanation for destroying some documents was to protect the lives of individuals involved in Iran and Contra operations.[58] It was not until 1993, years after the trial, that North's notebooks were made public, and only after the National Security Archive and Public Citizen sued the Office of the Independent Counsel under the Freedom of Information Act.[58] The diversion of funds is revealed What is involved is that in the course of the arms transfers, which involved the United States providing the arms to Israel and Israel in turn transferring the arms -- in effect, selling the arms to representatives of Iran. Certain monies which were received in the transaction between representatives of Israel and representatives of Iran were taken and made available to the forces in Central America, which are opposing the Sandinista government there.[79] – U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese, White House news conference on November 25, 1986 During the trial, North testified that on 21, 22 or 24 November, he witnessed Poindexter destroy what may have been the only signed copy of a presidential covert-action finding that sought to authorize CIA participation in the November 1985 Hawk missile shipment to Iran.[58] U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese admitted on 25 November that profits from weapons sales to Iran were made available to assist the Contra rebels in Nicaragua. On the same day, John Poindexter resigned, and President Reagan fired Oliver North.[80] Poindexter was replaced by Frank Carlucci on 2 December 1986.[81] When the story broke, many legal and constitutional scholars expressed dismay that the NSC, which was supposed to be just an advisory body to assist the President with formulating foreign policy, had "gone operational" by becoming an executive body covertly executing foreign policy on its own.[82] The National Security Act of 1947, which created the NSC, gave it the vague right to perform "such other functions and duties related to the intelligence as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."[83] However, the NSC had usually, although not always, acted as an advisory agency until the Reagan administration when the NSC had "gone operational", a situation that was condemned by both the Tower Commission and by Congress as a departure from the norm.[83] The American historian John Canham-Clyne asserted that Iran-Contra affair and the NSC "going operational" were not departures from the norm, but were the logical and natural consequence of existence of the "national security state", the plethora of shadowy government agencies with multi-million dollar budgets operating with little oversight from Congress, the courts or the media, and for whom upholding national security justified almost everything.[83] Canham-Clyne argued that for the "national security state", the law was an obstacle to be surmounted rather than something to uphold and that the Iran-Contra affair was just "business as usual", something he asserted that the media missed by focusing on the NSC having "gone operational."[83] In Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981–1987, journalist Bob Woodward chronicled the role of the CIA in facilitating the transfer of funds from the Iran arms sales to the Nicaraguan Contras spearheaded by Oliver North. According to Woodward, then-Director of the CIA William J. Casey admitted to him in February 1987 that he was aware of the diversion of funds to the Contras.[84] The controversial admission occurred while Casey was hospitalized for a stroke, and, according to his wife, was unable to communicate. On 6 May 1987, William Casey died the day after Congress began public hearings on Iran-Contra. Independent Counsel, Lawrence Walsh later wrote: "Independent Counsel obtained no documentary evidence showing Casey knew about or approved the diversion. The only direct testimony linking Casey to early knowledge of the diversion came from [Oliver] North."[85] Gust Avrakodos, who was responsible for the arms supplies to the Afghans at this time, was aware of the operation as well and strongly opposed it, in particular the diversion of funds allotted to the Afghan operation. According to his Middle Eastern experts, the operation was pointless because the moderates in Iran were not in a position to challenge the fundamentalists. However, he was overruled by Clair George.[86] Tower Commission Main article: Tower Commission On 25 November 1986, President Reagan announced the creation of a Special Review Board to look into the matter; the following day, he appointed former Senator John Tower, former Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, and former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to serve as members. This Presidential Commission took effect on 1 December and became known as the Tower Commission. The main objectives of the commission were to inquire into "the circumstances surrounding the Iran-Contra matter, other case studies that might reveal strengths and weaknesses in the operation of the National Security Council system under stress, and the manner in which that system has served eight different presidents since its inception in 1947". The Tower Commission was the first presidential commission to review and evaluate the National Security Council.[87] President Reagan (center) receives the Tower Commission Report in the White House Cabinet Room; John Tower is at left and Edmund Muskie is at right, 1987. President Reagan appeared before the Tower Commission on 2 December 1986, to answer questions regarding his involvement in the affair. When asked about his role in authorizing the arms deals, he first stated that he had; later, he appeared to contradict himself by stating that he had no recollection of doing so.[88] In his 1990 autobiography, An American Life, Reagan acknowledges authorizing the shipments to Israel.[89] The report published by the Tower Commission was delivered to the president on 26 February 1987. The commission had interviewed 80 witnesses to the scheme, including Reagan, and two of the arms trade middlemen: Manucher Ghorbanifar and Adnan Khashoggi.[88] The 200-page report was the most comprehensive of any released,[88] criticizing the actions of Oliver North, John Poindexter, Caspar Weinberger, and others. It determined that President Reagan did not have knowledge of the extent of the program, especially about the diversion of funds to the Contras, although it argued that the president ought to have had better control of the National Security Council staff. The report heavily criticized Reagan for not properly supervising his subordinates or being aware of their actions. A major result of the Tower Commission was the consensus that Reagan should have listened to his National Security Advisor more, thereby placing more power in the hands of that chair. Congressional committees investigating the affair Main article: Congressional committees investigating the Iran-Contra affair In January 1987, Congress announced it was opening an investigation into the Iran-Contra affair. Depending upon one's political perspective, the Congressional investigation into the Iran-Contra affair was either an attempt by the legislative arm to gain control over an out-of-control executive arm, a partisan "witch hunt" by the Democrats against a Republican administration or a feeble effort by Congress that did far too little to rein in the "imperial presidency" that had run amok by breaking numerous laws.[90] The Democratic-controlled United States Congress issued its own report on 18 November 1987, stating that "If the president did not know what his national security advisers were doing, he should have."[2] The Congressional report wrote that the president bore "ultimate responsibility" for wrongdoing by his aides, and his administration exhibited "secrecy, deception and disdain for the law".[91] It also read that "the central remaining question is the role of the President in the Iran-Contra affair. On this critical point, the shredding of documents by Poindexter, North and others, and the death of Casey, leave the record incomplete". Aftermath Reagan expressed regret with regard to the situation in a nationally televised address from the Oval Office on 4 March 1987, and in two other speeches.[92] Reagan had not spoken to the American people directly for three months amidst the scandal,[93] and he offered the following explanation for his silence: The reason I haven't spoken to you before now is this: You deserve the truth. And as frustrating as the waiting has been, I felt it was improper to come to you with sketchy reports, or possibly even erroneous statements, which would then have to be corrected, creating even more doubt and confusion. There's been enough of that.[93] Reagan then took full responsibility for the acts committed: First, let me say I take full responsibility for my own actions and for those of my administration. As angry as I may be about activities undertaken without my knowledge, I am still accountable for those activities. As disappointed as I may be in some who served me, I'm still the one who must answer to the American people for this behavior.[93] Finally, the president acknowledged that his previous assertions that the U.S. did not trade arms for hostages were incorrect: A few months ago I told the American people I did not trade arms for hostages. My heart and my best intentions still tell me that's true, but the facts and the evidence tell me it is not. As the Tower board reported, what began as a strategic opening to Iran deteriorated, in its implementation, into trading arms for hostages. This runs counter to my own beliefs, to administration policy, and to the original strategy we had in mind.[93] Reagan's role in these transactions is still not definitively known. It is unclear exactly what Reagan knew and when, and whether the arms sales were motivated by his desire to save the U.S. hostages. Oliver North wrote that "Ronald Reagan knew of and approved a great deal of what went on with both the Iranian initiative and private efforts on behalf of the contras and he received regular, detailed briefings on both...I have no doubt that he was told about the use of residuals for the Contras, and that he approved it. Enthusiastically."[94] Handwritten notes by Defense Secretary Weinberger indicate that the President was aware of potential hostage transfers[clarification needed] with Iran, as well as the sale of Hawk and TOW missiles to what he was told were "moderate elements" within Iran.[8] Notes taken by Weinberger on 7 December 1985 record that Reagan said that "he could answer charges of illegality but he couldn't answer charge that 'big strong President Reagan passed up a chance to free hostages'".[8] The Republican-written "Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair" made the following conclusion: There is some question and dispute about precisely the level at which he chose to follow the operation details. There is no doubt, however, ... [that] the President set the US policy towards Nicaragua, with few if any ambiguities, and then left subordinates more or less free to implement it.[95] Domestically, the affair precipitated a drop in President Reagan's popularity. His approval ratings suffered "the largest single drop for any U.S. president in history", from 67% to 46% in November 1986, according to a New York Times/CBS News poll.[96] The "Teflon President", as Reagan was nicknamed by critics,[97] survived the affair, however, and his approval rating recovered.[98] Internationally, the damage was more severe. Magnus Ranstorp wrote, "U.S. willingness to engage in concessions with Iran and the Hezbollah not only signaled to its adversaries that hostage-taking was an extremely useful instrument in extracting political and financial concessions for the West but also undermined any credibility of U.S. criticism of other states' deviation from the principles of no-negotiation and no concession to terrorists and their demands."[99] In Iran, Mehdi Hashemi, the leaker of the scandal, was executed in 1987, allegedly for activities unrelated to the scandal. Though Hashemi made a full video confession to numerous serious charges, some observers find the coincidence of his leak and the subsequent prosecution highly suspicious.[100] In 1994, just five years after leaving office, President Reagan announced that he had been diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease.[101] Lawrence Walsh, who was appointed Independent Counsel in 1986 to investigate the transactions later implied Reagan's declining health may have played a role in his handling of the situation. However, Walsh did note that he believed President Reagan's "instincts for the country's good were right".[102] Indictments North's mugshot,[103] after his arrest Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, was indicted on two counts of perjury and one count of obstruction of justice on 16 June 1992.[citation needed] Weinberger received a pardon from George H. W. Bush on 24 December 1992, before he was tried.[citation needed] Robert C. McFarlane, National Security Adviser, convicted of withholding evidence, but after a plea bargain was given only two years of probation. Later pardoned by President George H. W. Bush.[104] Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State, convicted of withholding evidence, but after a plea bargain was given only two years probation. Later pardoned by President George H. W. Bush.[105] Alan D. Fiers, Chief of the CIA's Central American Task Force, convicted of withholding evidence and sentenced to one year probation. Later pardoned by President George H. W. Bush. Clair George, Chief of Covert Ops-CIA, convicted on two charges of perjury, but pardoned by President George H. W. Bush before sentencing.[106] Oliver North, member of the National Security Council was indicted on 16 charges.[107] A jury convicted him of accepting an illegal gratuity, obstruction of a Congressional inquiry, and destruction of documents. The convictions were overturned on appeal because his Fifth Amendment rights may have been violated by use of his immunized public testimony[108] and because the judge had incorrectly explained the crime of destruction of documents to the jury.[109] Fawn Hall, Oliver North's secretary, was given immunity from prosecution on charges of conspiracy and destroying documents in exchange for her testimony.[110] Jonathan Scott Royster, Liaison to Oliver North, was given immunity from prosecution on charges of conspiracy and destroying documents in exchange for his testimony.[111] National Security Advisor John Poindexter was convicted of five counts of conspiracy, obstruction of justice, perjury, defrauding the government, and the alteration and destruction of evidence. A panel of the D.C. Circuit overturned the convictions on 15 November 1991 for the same reason the court had overturned Oliver North's, and by the same 2 to 1 vote.[112] The Supreme Court refused to hear the case.[113] Duane Clarridge. An ex-CIA senior official, he was indicted in November 1991 on seven counts of perjury and false statements relating to a November 1985 shipment to Iran. Pardoned before trial by President George H. W. Bush.[114][115] Richard V. Secord. Former Air Force major general, who was involved in arms transfers to Iran and diversion of funds to Contras, he pleaded guilty in November 1989 to making false statements to Congress and was sentenced to two years of probation. As part of his plea bargain, Secord agreed to provide further truthful testimony in exchange for the dismissal of remaining criminal charges against him.[116][18] Albert Hakim. A businessman, he pleaded guilty in November 1989 to supplementing the salary of North by buying a $13,800 fence for North with money from "the Enterprise," which was a set of foreign companies Hakim used in Iran-Contra. In addition, Swiss company Lake Resources Inc., used for storing money from arms sales to Iran to give to the Contras, plead guilty to stealing government property.[117] Hakim was given two years of probation and a $5,000 fine, while Lake Resources Inc. was ordered to dissolve.[116][118] Thomas G. Clines. A former CIA clandestine service officer. According to Special Prosecutor Walsh, he earned nearly $883,000 helping retired Air Force Maj. Gen. Richard V. Secord and Albert Hakim carry out the secret operations of "the Enterprise". He was indicted for concealing the full amount of his Enterprise profits for the 1985 and 1986 tax years, and for failing to declare his foreign financial accounts. He was convicted and served 16 months in prison, the only Iran-Contra defendant to have served a prison sentence.[119] The Independent Counsel, Lawrence E. Walsh, chose not to re-try North or Poindexter.[120] In total, several dozen people were investigated by Walsh's office.[121] George H. W. Bush's involvement On 27 July 1986, Israeli counterterrorism expert Amiram Nir briefed Vice President Bush in Jerusalem about the weapon sales to Iran.[122] In an interview with The Washington Post in August 1987, Bush stated that he was denied information about the operation and did not know about the diversion of funds.[123] Bush said that he had not advised Reagan to reject the initiative because he had not heard strong objections to it.[123] The Post quoted him as stating, "We were not in the loop."[123] The following month, Bush recounted meeting Nir in his September 1987 autobiography Looking Forward, stating that he began to develop misgivings about the Iran initiative.[124] He wrote that he did not learn the full extent of the Iran dealings until he was briefed by Senator David Durenberger regarding a Senate inquiry into them.[124] Bush added the briefing with Durenberger left him with the feeling he had "been deliberately excluded from key meetings involving details of the Iran operation".[124] In January 1988 during a live interview with Bush on CBS Evening News, Dan Rather told Bush that his unwillingness to speak about the scandal led "people to say 'either George Bush was irrelevant or he was ineffective, he set himself outside of the loop.'"[125] Bush replied, "May I explain what I mean by 'out of the loop'? No operational role."[125][126] Although Bush publicly insisted that he knew little about the operation, his statements were contradicted by excerpts of his diary released by the White House in January 1993.[125][127] An entry dated 5 November 1986 stated: "On the news at this time is the question of the hostages... I'm one of the few people that know fully the details, and there is a lot of flak and misinformation out there. It is not a subject we can talk about..."[125][127] Pardons On 24 December 1992, after he had been defeated for reelection, lame duck President George H. W. Bush pardoned five administration officials who had been found guilty on charges relating to the affair.[128] They were: Elliott Abrams; Duane Clarridge; Alan Fiers; Clair George; and Robert McFarlane. Bush also pardoned Caspar Weinberger, who had not yet come to trial.[129] Attorney General William P. Barr advised the President on these pardons, especially that of Caspar Weinberger.[130] In response to these Bush pardons, Independent Counsel Lawrence E. Walsh, who headed the investigation of Reagan administration officials' criminal conduct in the Iran-Contra scandal, stated that "the Iran-Contra cover-up, which has continued for more than six years, has now been completed." Walsh noted that in issuing the pardons Bush appears to have been preempting being implicated himself in the crimes of Iran-Contra by evidence that was to come to light during the Weinberger trial, and noted that there was a pattern of "deception and obstruction" by Bush, Weinberger and other senior Reagan administration officials.[120][13][14] Modern interpretations The Iran-Contra affair and the ensuing deception to protect senior administration officials (including President Reagan) was cast as an example of post-truth politics by Malcolm Byrne of George Washington University.[131] Reports and documents The 100th Congress formed a Joint Committee of the United States Congress (Congressional Committees Investigating The Iran-Contra Affair) and held hearings in mid-1987. Transcripts were published as: Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran (U.S. GPO 1987–88). A closed Executive Session heard classified testimony from North and Poindexter; this transcript was published in a redacted format. The joint committee's final report was Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair With Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views (U.S. GPO 17 November 1987). The records of the committee are at the National Archives, but many are still non-public.[132] Testimony was also heard before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and can be found in the Congressional Record for those bodies. The Senate Intelligence Committee produced two reports: Preliminary Inquiry into the Sale of Arms to Iran and Possible Diversion of Funds to the Nicaraguan Resistance (2 February 1987) and Were Relevant Documents Withheld from the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair? (June 1989).[133] The Tower Commission Report was published as the Report of the President's Special Review Board (U.S. GPO 26 February 1987). It was also published as The Tower Commission Report by Bantam Books (ISBN 0-553-26968-2). The Office of Independent Counsel/Walsh investigation produced four interim reports to Congress. Its final report was published as the Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters. Walsh's records are available at the National Archives.[134] See also icon1980s portal Israel–United States relations Israel's role in the Iran–Iraq War Timeline of the Iran–Contra affair Brokers of Death arms case CIA involvement in Contra cocaine trafficking Congressional committees investigating the Iran–Contra affair Iran–Iraq relations Iran–Israel relations Iran–United States relations Iraq–Israel relations Iraq–United States relations Latin America–United States relations List of federal political scandals in the United States William Northrop 1980 October Surprise theory Operation Tipped Kettle (the transfer of PLO weapons which were seized by Israel in Lebanon to the Contras) United States and state-sponsored terrorism United States foreign policy in the Middle East United States involvement in regime change in Latin America Footnotes The Iran-Contra Affair 20 Years On. The National Security Archive (George Washington University), 2006-11-24 "Reagan's mixed White House legacy". BBC. 6 June 2004. Retrieved 22 April 2008. Butterfield, Fox (27 November 1988). "Arms for Hostages – Plain and Simple". The New York Times (National ed.). sec. 7. p. 10. Retrieved 29 December 2018. Abshire, David (2005). Saving the Reagan Presidency: Trust Is the Coin of the Realm. Texas A&M University Press. ISBN 9781603446204. Valentine, Douglas (2008). Reagan, Bush, Gorbachev: Revisiting the End of the Cold War. Praeger Security International. ISBN 9780313352416. Rozen, Laura (21 March 2005). "The Front". Reagan 1990, p. 542. "Weinberger Diaries Dec 7 handwritten" (PDF). National Security Archive. George Washington University. Reagan, Ronald (13 November 1986). "Address to the Nation on the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy". Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation. Retrieved 7 June 2008. "Excerpts From the Iran-Contra Report: A Secret Foreign Policy". The New York Times. 1994. Retrieved 7 June 2008. Reagan, Ronald (4 March 1987). "Address to the Nation on the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy". Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation. Retrieved 7 June 2008. Dwyer, Paula. "Pointing a Finger at Reagan". Business Week. Archived from the original on 16 April 2008. Retrieved 22 April 2008. "Pardons Granted by President George H. W. Bush (1989-1993)". U.S. Department of Justice. 12 January 2015. Archived from the original on 23 December 2020. Retrieved 22 December 2020. Walsh, Lawrence E. (1997). Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-up. New York: Norton & Company. p. 290. Walsh 1993. Kornbluh & Byrne 1993, p. 213. Hicks 1996, p. 965. Johnston, David (9 November 1989). "Secord Is Guilty of One Charge in Contra Affair". The New York Times (National ed.). sec. A. p. 24. Retrieved 19 July 2011. Corn, David (2 July 1988). "Is There Really A 'Secret Team'?". The Nation. Hicks 1996, p. 966. Hicks 1996, p. 964. Hicks 1996, pp. 966–967. Lemoyne, James (19 October 1986). "Ortega, Faulting Reagan, Warns of Coming War". The New York Times (National ed.). sec. 1. p. 6. Retrieved 15 November 2018. Payton, Brenda (4 April 1988). "Is U.S. Backing Contras with Drug Funds?". Oakland Tribune. Powell, Colin L.; Persico, Joseph E. (1995). My American Journey. New York: Random House. p. 341. ISBN 0-679-43296-5. "Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega's complex US ties suggest lessons for Trump era, historians say". ABC News. Retrieved 7 November 2021. Plaut, Martin (30 October 2018). "Apartheid, guns and money: book lifts the lid on Cold War secrets". The Conversation. Retrieved 7 November 2021. Van Vuuren, Hennie (2018). Apartheid guns and money : a tale of profit. London. pp. 260–269. ISBN 978-1-78738-247-3. OCLC 1100767741. Plaut, Martin (3 November 2018). "The Chinese and Soviets had a bigger role in supporting apartheid than we previously knew". Quartz. Retrieved 6 November 2021. Guerrero, Alina (18 June 1986). "Danish Ship Caught Carrying Soviet-Made Weapons". Associated Press News. Tyroler, Deborah (17 December 1986). "The Pia Vesta Caper: A New Dimension To Contragate". NotiCen. Hersh, Seymour M. (8 December 1991). "U.S. Said to Have Allowed Israel to Sell Arms to Iran". The New York Times (National ed.). sec. 1. p. 1. Retrieved 15 November 2018. Kornbluh & Byrne 1993, pp. 213–214. Kornbluh & Byrne 1993, p. 214. "The Iran-Contra Scandal". The American–Israeli Cooperative Enterprise. Retrieved 7 June 2008. "State Sponsors of Terrorism". State.gov. Retrieved 18 August 2014. Reagan 1990, p. 504. Brogan, Patrick (1989). The Fighting Never Stopped: A Comprehensive Guide To World Conflicts Since 1945. New York: Vintage Books. p.

Delves into the intricate world of clandestine operations and espionage. Set against the backdrop of the Cold War era, the movie intricately weaves together various facets of espionage, offering a captivating insight into the covert activities of agents operating in a high-stakes environment. The film captures the tension and secrecy inherent in espionage through its portrayal of personal meetings, where agents navigate intricate webs of deceit and danger while trying to gather crucial information. These meetings often serve as the nerve center of the clandestine operations, showcasing the strategic and high-stakes nature of intelligence gathering. Additionally, "Appointment with Adventure" portrays the activities of agents as they engage in covert missions, using their wits and skills to navigate through perilous situations, highlighting the risks and sacrifices involved in their line of work. The film also explores the clandestine communications utilized by spies to relay sensitive information, showcasing the sophisticated methods employed to ensure secrecy and confidentiality in their exchanges. Whether through codes, encrypted messages, or hidden signals, the movie sheds light on the complexity of communication in the world of espionage. Surveillance plays a pivotal role in the narrative, depicting the art of monitoring and observing targets, unveiling the intricate techniques used to gather intelligence while remaining undetected. The tension and suspense escalate as agents surveil their targets, knowing that a single misstep could jeopardize the entire operation. Espionage, spying, or intelligence gathering is the act of obtaining secret or confidential information (intelligence). A person who commits espionage is called an espionage agent or spy.[1] Any individual or spy ring (a cooperating group of spies), in the service of a government, company, criminal organization, or independent operation, can commit espionage. The practice is clandestine, as it is by definition unwelcome. In some circumstances, it may be a legal tool of law enforcement and in others, it may be illegal and punishable by law. Espionage is often part of an institutional effort by a government or commercial concern. However, the term tends to be associated with state spying on potential or actual enemies for military purposes. Spying involving corporations is known as industrial espionage. One way to gather data and information about a targeted organization is by infiltrating its ranks. Spies can then return information such as the size and strength of enemy forces. They can also find dissidents within the organization and influence them to provide further information or to defect.[2] In times of crisis, spies steal technology and sabotage the enemy in various ways. Counterintelligence is the practice of thwarting enemy espionage and intelligence-gathering. Almost all sovereign states have strict laws concerning espionage, including those who practice espionage in other countries, and the penalties for being caught are often severe. History Main article: History of espionage Espionage has been recognized as of importance in military affairs since ancient times. The oldest known classified document was a report made by a spy disguised as a diplomatic envoy in the court of King Hammurabi, who died in around 1750 BC. The ancient Egyptians had a developed secret service, and espionage is mentioned in the Iliad, the Bible, and the Amarna letters as well as its recordings in the story of the Old Testament, The Twelve Spies.[3] Espionage was also prevalent in the Greco-Roman world, when spies employed illiterate subjects in civil services.[citation needed][4] The thesis that espionage and intelligence has a central role in war as well as peace was first advanced in The Art of War and in the Arthashastra. In the Middle Ages European states excelled at what has later been termed counter-subversion when Catholic inquisitions were staged to annihilate heresy. Inquisitions were marked by centrally organised mass interrogations and detailed record keeping. During the Renaissance European states funded codebreakers to obtain intelligence through frequency analysis. Western espionage changed fundamentally during the Renaissance when Italian city-states installed resident ambassadors in capital cities to collect intelligence. Renaissance Venice became so obsessed with espionage that the Council of Ten, which was nominally responsible for security, did not even allow the doge to consult government archives freely. In 1481 the Council of Ten barred all Venetian government officials from making contact with ambassadors or foreigners. Those revealing official secrets could face the death penalty. Venice became obsessed with espionage because successful international trade demanded that the city-state could protect its trade secrets. Under Queen Elizabeth I of England (r. 1558–1603), Francis Walsingham (c. 1532–1590) was appointed foreign secretary and intelligence chief.[5] The novelist and journalist Daniel Defoe (died 1731) not only spied for the British government, but also developed a theory of espionage foreshadowing modern police-state methods.[6] During the American Revolution, Nathan Hale and Benedict Arnold achieved their fame as spies, and there was considerable use of spies on both sides during the American Civil War.[7][8] Though not a spy himself, George Washington was America's first spymaster, utilizing espionage tactics against the British.[3] Madame Minna Craucher (right), a Finnish socialite and spy, with her chauffeur Boris Wolkowski (left) in 1930s In the 20th century, at the height of World War I, all great powers except the United States had elaborate civilian espionage systems and all national military establishments had intelligence units. In order to protect the country against foreign agents, the U.S. Congress passed the Espionage Act of 1917. Mata Hari, who obtained information for Germany by seducing French officials, was the most noted espionage agent of World War I. Prior to World War II, Germany and Imperial Japan established elaborate espionage nets. In 1942 the Office of Strategic Services was founded by Gen. William J. Donovan. However, the British system was the keystone of Allied intelligence. Numerous resistance groups such as the Austrian Maier-Messner Group, the French Resistance, the Witte Brigade, Milorg and the Polish Home Army worked against Nazi Germany and provided the Allied secret services with information that was very important for the war effort. Since the end of World War II, the activity of espionage has enlarged, much of it growing out of the Cold War between the United States and the former USSR. The Russian Empire and its successor, the Soviet Union have had a long tradition of espionage ranging from the Okhrana to the KGB (Committee for State Security), which also acted as a secret police force. In the United States, the 1947 National Security Act created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to coordinate intelligence and the National Security Agency for research into codes and electronic communication. In addition to these, the United States has 13 other intelligence gathering agencies; most of the U.S. expenditures for intelligence gathering are budgeted to various Defense Dept. agencies and their programs. Under the intelligence reorganization of 2004, the director of national intelligence is responsible for overseeing and coordinating the activities and budgets of the U.S. intelligence agencies. In the Cold War, espionage cases included Alger Hiss and Whittaker Chambers and the Rosenberg Case. In 1952 the Communist Chinese captured two CIA agents, and in 1960 Francis Gary Powers, flying a U-2 reconnaissance mission over the Soviet Union for the CIA, was shot down and captured. During the Cold War, many Soviet intelligence officials defected to the West, including Gen. Walter Krivitsky, Victor Kravchenko, Vladimir Petrov, Peter Deriabin Pawel Monat, and Oleg Penkovsky, of the GRU. Among Western officials who defected to the Soviet Union are Guy Burgess and Donald D. Maclean of Great Britain in 1951, Otto John of West Germany in 1954, William H. Martin and Bernon F. Mitchell, U.S. cryptographers, in 1960, and Harold (Kim) Philby of Great Britain in 1962. U.S. acknowledgment of its U-2 flights and the exchange of Francis Gary Powers for Rudolf Abel in 1962 implied the legitimacy of some espionage as an arm of foreign policy. China has a very cost-effective intelligence program that is especially effective in monitoring neighboring countries such as Mongolia, Russia, and India. Smaller countries can also mount effective and focused espionage efforts. For instance, the Vietnamese communists had consistently superior intelligence during the Vietnam War. Some Islamic countries, including Libya, Iran, and Syria, have highly developed operations as well. SAVAK, the secret police of the Pahlavi dynasty, was particularly feared by Iranian dissidents before the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Modern day Today, spy agencies target the illegal drug trade and terrorists as well as state actors.[9] Intelligence services value certain intelligence collection techniques over others. The former Soviet Union, for example, preferred human sources over research in open sources, while the United States has tended to emphasize technological methods such as SIGINT and IMINT. In the Soviet Union, both political (KGB) and military intelligence (GRU)[10] officers were judged by the number of agents they recruited. Targets of espionage Espionage agents are usually trained experts in a targeted field so they can differentiate mundane information from targets of value to their own organizational development. Correct identification of the target at its execution is the sole purpose of the espionage operation.[citation needed] Broad areas of espionage targeting expertise include:[citation needed] Natural resources: strategic production identification and assessment (food, energy, materials). Agents are usually found among bureaucrats who administer these resources in their own countries Popular sentiment towards domestic and foreign policies (popular, middle class, elites). Agents often recruited from field journalistic crews, exchange postgraduate students and sociology researchers Strategic economic strengths (production, research, manufacture, infrastructure). Agents recruited from science and technology academia, commercial enterprises, and more rarely from among military technologists Military capability intelligence (offensive, defensive, manoeuvre, naval, air, space). Agents are trained by military espionage education facilities and posted to an area of operation with covert identities to minimize prosecution Counterintelligence operations targeting opponents' intelligence services themselves, such as breaching the confidentiality of communications, and recruiting defectors or moles Methods and terminology Although the news media may speak of "spy satellites" and the like, espionage is not a synonym for all intelligence-gathering disciplines. It is a specific form of human source intelligence (HUMINT). Codebreaking (cryptanalysis or COMINT), aircraft or satellite photography (IMINT), and analysis of publicly available data sources (OSINT) are all intelligence gathering disciplines, but none of them is considered espionage. Many HUMINT activities, such as prisoner interrogation, reports from military reconnaissance patrols and from diplomats, etc., are not considered espionage. Espionage is the disclosure of sensitive information (classified) to people who are not cleared for that information or access to that sensitive information. Unlike other forms of intelligence collection disciplines, espionage usually involves accessing the place where the desired information is stored or accessing the people who know the information and will divulge it through some kind of subterfuge. There are exceptions to physical meetings, such as the Oslo Report, or the insistence of Robert Hanssen in never meeting the people who bought his information. The US defines espionage towards itself as "the act of obtaining, delivering, transmitting, communicating, or receiving information about the national defence with an intent, or reason to believe, that the information may be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation". Black's Law Dictionary (1990) defines espionage as: "... gathering, transmitting, or losing ... information related to the national defense". Espionage is a violation of United States law, 18 U.S.C. §§ 792–798 and Article 106a of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.[11] The United States, like most nations, conducts espionage against other nations, under the control of the National Clandestine Service. This article needs to be updated. The reason given is: What about the Defense Department, and the Director of National Intelligence?. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information. (December 2021) Britain's espionage activities are controlled by the Secret Intelligence Service. Technology and techniques See also: Tradecraft and List of intelligence gathering disciplines Agent handling Biographic leverage Concealment device Covert agent Covert listening device Cut-out Cyber spying Dead drop False flag operations Front organisation Honeypot Impersonation Impostor Interrogation Non-official cover Numbers messaging Official cover One-way voice link Sabotage Safe house Side channel attack Spy ship Steganography Surveillance Surveillance aircraft Surveillance balloon Source:[12] Organization An intelligence officer's clothing, accessories, and behavior must be as unremarkable as possible—their lives (and others') may depend on it. A spy is a person employed to seek out top secret information from a source.[13] Within the United States Intelligence Community, "asset" is more common usage. A case officer or Special Agent, who may have diplomatic status (i.e., official cover or non-official cover), supports and directs the human collector. Cut-outs are couriers who do not know the agent or case officer but transfer messages. A safe house is a refuge for spies. Spies often seek to obtain secret information from another source. In larger networks, the organization can be complex with many methods to avoid detection, including clandestine cell systems. Often the players have never met. Case officers are stationed in foreign countries to recruit and supervise intelligence agents,[13] who in turn spy on targets in the countries where they are assigned. A spy need not be a citizen of the target country and hence does not automatically commit treason when operating within it. While the more common practice is to recruit a person already trusted with access to sensitive information, sometimes a person with a well-prepared synthetic identity (cover background), called a legend[13] in tradecraft, may attempt to infiltrate a target organization. These agents can be moles (who are recruited before they get access to secrets), defectors (who are recruited after they get access to secrets and leave their country) or defectors in place (who get access but do not leave). A legend is also employed for an individual who is not an illegal agent, but is an ordinary citizen who is "relocated", for example, a "protected witness". Nevertheless, such a non-agent very likely will also have a case officer who will act as a controller. As in most, if not all synthetic identity schemes, for whatever purpose (illegal or legal), the assistance of a controller is required. Spies may also be used to spread disinformation in the organization in which they are planted, such as giving false reports about their country's military movements, or about a competing company's ability to bring a product to market. Spies may be given other roles that also require infiltration, such as sabotage. Many governments spy on their allies as well as their enemies, although they typically maintain a policy of not commenting on this. Governments also employ private companies to collect information on their behalf such as SCG International Risk, International Intelligence Limited and others. Many organizations, both national and non-national, conduct espionage operations. It should not be assumed that espionage is always directed at the most secret operations of a target country. National and terrorist organizations and other groups are also targeted.[14] This is because governments want to retrieve information that they can use to be proactive in protecting their nation from potential terrorist attacks. Communications both are necessary to espionage and clandestine operations, and also a great vulnerability when the adversary has sophisticated SIGINT detection and interception capability. Spies rely on COVCOM or covert communication through technically advanced spy devices.[3] Agents must also transfer money securely. Industrial espionage Main article: Industrial espionage Reportedly Canada is losing $12 billion[15] and German companies are estimated to be losing about €50 billion ($87 billion) and 30,000 jobs[16] to industrial espionage every year. Agents in espionage In espionage jargon, an "agent" is the person who does the spying. They may be a citizen of a country recruited by that country to spy on another; a citizen of a country recruited by that country to carry out false flag assignments disrupting his own country; a citizen of one country who is recruited by a second country to spy on or work against his own country or a third country, and more. In popular usage, this term is sometimes confused with an intelligence officer, intelligence operative, or case officer who recruits and handles agents. Among the most common forms of agent are: Agent provocateur: instigates trouble or provides information to gather as many people as possible into one location for an arrest. Intelligence agent: provides access to sensitive information through the use of special privileges. If used in corporate intelligence gathering, this may include gathering information of a corporate business venture or stock portfolio. In economic intelligence, "Economic Analysts may use their specialized skills to analyze and interpret economic trends and developments, assess and track foreign financial activities, and develop new econometric and modelling methodologies."[17] This may also include information of trade or tariff. Agent-of-influence: provides political influence in an area of interest, possibly including publications needed to further an intelligence service agenda.[13] The use of the media to print a story to mislead a foreign service into action, exposing their operations while under surveillance. Double agent: engages in clandestine activity for two intelligence or security services (or more in joint operations), who provides information about one or about each to the other, and who wittingly withholds significant information from one on the instructions of the other or is unwittingly manipulated by one so that significant facts are withheld from the adversary. Peddlers, fabricators, and others who work for themselves rather than a service are not double agents because they are not agents. The fact that double agents have an agent relationship with both sides distinguishes them from penetrations, who normally are placed with the target service in a staff or officer capacity."[18] Redoubled agent: forced to mislead the foreign intelligence service after being caught as a double agent. Unwitting double agent: offers or is forced to recruit as a double or redoubled agent and in the process is recruited by either a third-party intelligence service or his own government without the knowledge of the intended target intelligence service or the agent. This can be useful in capturing important information from an agent that is attempting to seek allegiance with another country. The double agent usually has knowledge of both intelligence services and can identify operational techniques of both, thus making third-party recruitment difficult or impossible. The knowledge of operational techniques can also affect the relationship between the operations officer (or case officer) and the agent if the case is transferred by an operational targeting officer] to a new operations officer, leaving the new officer vulnerable to attack. This type of transfer may occur when an officer has completed his term of service or when his cover is blown. Sleeper agent: recruited to wake up and perform a specific set of tasks or functions while living undercover in an area of interest. This type of agent is not the same as a deep cover operative, who continually contacts a case officer to file intelligence reports. A sleeper agent is not in contact with anyone until activated. Triple agent: works for three intelligence services.[how?] Less common or lesser known forms of agent include: Access agent: provides access to other potential agents by providing offender profiling information that can help lead to recruitment into an intelligence service. Confusion agent: provides misleading information to an enemy intelligence service or attempts to discredit the operations of the target in an operation. Facilities agent: provides access to buildings, such as garages or offices used for staging operations, resupply, etc. Illegal agent: lives in another country under false credentials and does not report to a local station. A nonofficial cover operative can be dubbed an "illegal"[19] when working in another country without diplomatic protection. Principal agent: functions as a handler for an established network of agents, usually considered "blue chip". Law Espionage against a nation is a crime under the legal code of many nations. In the United States, it is covered by the Espionage Act of 1917. The risks of espionage vary. A spy violating the host country's laws may be deported, imprisoned, or even executed. A spy violating its own country's laws can be imprisoned for espionage or/and treason (which in the United States and some other jurisdictions can only occur if they take up arms or aids the enemy against their own country during wartime), or even executed, as the Rosenbergs were. For example, when Aldrich Ames handed a stack of dossiers of U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents in the Eastern Bloc to his KGB-officer "handler", the KGB "rolled up" several networks, and at least ten people were secretly shot. When Ames was arrested by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), he faced life in prison; his contact, who had diplomatic immunity, was declared persona non grata and taken to the airport. Ames' wife was threatened with life imprisonment if her husband did not cooperate; he did, and she was given a five-year sentence. Hugh Francis Redmond, a CIA officer in China, spent nineteen years in a Chinese prison for espionage—and died there—as he was operating without diplomatic cover and immunity.[20] In United States law, treason,[21] espionage,[22] and spying[23] are separate crimes. Treason and espionage have graduated punishment levels. The United States in World War I passed the Espionage Act of 1917. Over the years, many spies, such as the Soble spy ring, Robert Lee Johnson, the Rosenberg ring, Aldrich Hazen Ames,[24] Robert Philip Hanssen,[25] Jonathan Pollard, John Anthony Walker, James Hall III, and others have been prosecuted under this law. History of espionage laws From ancient times, the penalty for espionage in many countries was execution. This was true right up until the era of World War II; for example, Josef Jakobs was a Nazi spy who parachuted into Great Britain in 1941 and was executed for espionage. In modern times, many people convicted of espionage have been given penal sentences rather than execution. For example, Aldrich Hazen Ames is an American CIA analyst, turned KGB mole, who was convicted of espionage in 1994; he is serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole in the high-security Allenwood U.S. Penitentiary.[26] Ames was formerly a 31-year CIA counterintelligence officer and analyst who committed espionage against his country by spying for the Soviet Union and Russia.[27] So far as it is known, Ames compromised the second-largest number of CIA agents, second only to Robert Hanssen, who also served a prison sentence until his death in 2023.[28] Use against non-spies Espionage laws are also used to prosecute non-spies. In the United States, the Espionage Act of 1917 was used against socialist politician Eugene V. Debs (at that time the Act had much stricter guidelines and amongst other things banned speech against military recruiting). The law was later used to suppress publication of periodicals, for example of Father Coughlin in World War II. In the early 21st century, the act was used to prosecute whistleblowers such as Thomas Andrews Drake, John Kiriakou, and Edward Snowden, as well as officials who communicated with journalists for innocuous reasons, such as Stephen Jin-Woo Kim.[29][30] As of 2012, India and Pakistan were holding several hundred prisoners of each other's country for minor violations like trespass or visa overstay, often with accusations of espionage attached. Some of these include cases where Pakistan and India both deny citizenship to these people, leaving them stateless.[citation needed] The BBC reported in 2012 on one such case, that of Mohammed Idrees, who was held under Indian police control for approximately 13 years for overstaying his 15-day visa by 2–3 days after seeing his ill parents in 1999. Much of the 13 years were spent in prison waiting for a hearing, and more time was spent homeless or living with generous families. The Indian People's Union for Civil Liberties and Human Rights Law Network both decried his treatment. The BBC attributed some of the problems to tensions caused by the Kashmir conflict.[31] Espionage laws in the UK Espionage is illegal in the UK under the Official Secrets Acts of 1911 and 1920. The UK law under this legislation considers espionage as "concerning those who intend to help an enemy and deliberately harm the security of the nation". According to MI5, a person commits the offence of 'spying' if they, "for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State": approaches, enters or inspects a prohibited area; makes documents such as plans that are intended, calculated, or could directly or indirectly be of use to an enemy; or "obtains, collects, records, or publishes, or communicates to any other person any secret official code word, or password, or any sketch, plan, model, article, or note, or other document which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy". The illegality of espionage also includes any action which may be considered 'preparatory to' spying, or encouraging or aiding another to spy.[32] Under the penal codes of the UK, those found guilty of espionage are liable to imprisonment for a term of up to 14 years, although multiple sentences can be issued. Government intelligence laws and its distinction from espionage Government intelligence is very much distinct from espionage, and is not illegal in the UK, providing that the organisations of individuals are registered, often with the ICO, and are acting within the restrictions of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA). 'Intelligence' is considered legally as "information of all sorts gathered by a government or organisation to guide its decisions. It includes information that may be both public and private, obtained from much different public or secret sources. It could consist entirely of information from either publicly available or secret sources, or be a combination of the two."[33] However, espionage and intelligence can be linked. According to the MI5 website, "foreign intelligence officers acting in the UK under diplomatic cover may enjoy immunity from prosecution. Such persons can only be tried for spying (or, indeed, any criminal offence) if diplomatic immunity is waived beforehand. Those officers operating without diplomatic cover have no such immunity from prosecution". There are also laws surrounding government and organisational intelligence and surveillance. Generally, the body involved should be issued with some form of warrant or permission from the government and should be enacting their procedures in the interest of protecting national security or the safety of public citizens. Those carrying out intelligence missions should act within not only RIPA but also the Data Protection Act and Human Rights Act. However, there are spy equipment laws and legal requirements around intelligence methods that vary for each form of intelligence enacted. War Painting of French spy captured during the Franco-Prussian War In war, espionage is considered permissible as many nations recognize the inevitability of opposing sides seeking intelligence each about the dispositions of the other. To make the mission easier and successful, combatants wear disguises to conceal their true identity from the enemy while penetrating enemy lines for intelligence gathering. However, if they are caught behind enemy lines in disguises, they are not entitled to prisoner-of-war status and subject to prosecution and punishment—including execution. The Hague Convention of 1907 addresses the status of wartime spies, specifically within "Laws and Customs of War on Land" (Hague IV); October 18, 1907: CHAPTER II Spies".[34] Article 29 states that a person is considered a spy who, acts clandestinely or on false pretences, infiltrates enemy lines with the intention of acquiring intelligence about the enemy and communicate it to the belligerent during times of war. Soldiers who penetrate enemy lines in proper uniforms for the purpose of acquiring intelligence are not considered spies but are lawful combatants entitled to be treated as prisoners of war upon capture by the enemy. Article 30 states that a spy captured behind enemy lines may only be punished following a trial. However, Article 31 provides that if a spy successfully rejoined his own military and is then captured by the enemy as a lawful combatant, he cannot be punished for his previous acts of espionage and must be treated as a prisoner of war. This provision does not apply to citizens who committed treason against their own country or co-belligerents of that country and may be captured and prosecuted at any place or any time regardless whether he rejoined the military to which he belongs or not or during or after the war.[35][36] The ones that are excluded from being treated as spies while behind enemy lines are escaping prisoners of war and downed airmen as international law distinguishes between a disguised spy and a disguised escaper.[12] It is permissible for these groups to wear enemy uniforms or civilian clothes in order to facilitate their escape back to friendly lines so long as they do not attack enemy forces, collect military intelligence, or engage in similar military operations while so disguised.[37][38] Soldiers who are wearing enemy uniforms or civilian clothes simply for the sake of warmth along with other purposes rather than engaging in espionage or similar military operations while so attired are also excluded from being treated as unlawful combatants.[12] Saboteurs are treated as spies as they too wear disguises behind enemy lines for the purpose of waging destruction on an enemy's vital targets in addition to intelligence gathering.[39][40] For example, during World War II, eight German agents entered the U.S. in June 1942 as part of Operation Pastorius, a sabotage mission against U.S. economic targets. Two weeks later, all were arrested in civilian clothes by the FBI thanks to two German agents betraying the mission to the U.S. Under the Hague Convention of 1907, these Germans were classified as spies and tried by a military tribunal in Washington D.C.[41] On August 3, 1942, all eight were found guilty and sentenced to death. Five days later, six were executed by electric chair at the District of Columbia jail. Two who had given evidence against the others had their sentences reduced by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to prison terms. In 1948, they were released by President Harry S. Truman and deported to the American Zone of occupied Germany. The U.S. codification of enemy spies is Article 106 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. This provides a mandatory death sentence if a person captured in the act is proven to be "lurking as a spy or acting as a spy in or about any place, vessel, or aircraft, within the control or jurisdiction of any of the armed forces, or in or about any shipyard, any manufacturing or industrial plant, or any other place or institution engaged in work in aid of the prosecution of the war by the United States, or elsewhere".[42] Spy fiction Main article: Spy fiction Spies have long been favorite topics for novelists and filmmakers.[43] An early example of espionage literature is Kim by the English novelist Rudyard Kipling, with a description of the training of an intelligence agent in the Great Game between the UK and Russia in 19th century Central Asia. An even earlier work was James Fenimore Cooper's classic novel, The Spy, written in 1821, about an American spy in New York during the Revolutionary War. During the many 20th-century spy scandals, much information became publicly known about national spy agencies and dozens of real-life secret agents. These sensational stories piqued public interest in a profession largely off-limits to human interest news reporting, a natural consequence of the secrecy inherent in their work. To fill in the blanks, the popular conception of the secret agent has been formed largely by 20th and 21st-century fiction and film. Attractive and sociable real-life agents such as Valerie Plame find little employment in serious fiction, however. The fictional secret agent is more often a loner, sometimes amoral—an existential hero operating outside the everyday constraints of society. Loner spy personalities may have been a stereotype of convenience for authors who already knew how to write loner private investigator characters that sold well from the 1920s to the present.[44] Johnny Fedora achieved popularity as a fictional agent of early Cold War espionage, but James Bond is the most commercially successful of the many spy characters created by intelligence insiders during that struggle. Other fictional agents include Le Carré's George Smiley, and Harry Palmer as played by Michael Caine. Jumping on the spy bandwagon, other writers also started writing about spy fiction featuring female spies as protagonists, such as The Baroness, which has more graphic action and sex, as compared to other novels featuring male protagonists. Spy fiction has permeated the video game world as well, in games such as Perfect Dark, GoldenEye 007, No One Lives Forever, and the Metal Gear series. Espionage has also made its way into comedy depictions. The 1960s TV series Get Smart, the 1983 Finnish film Agent 000 and the Deadly Curves, and Johnny English film trilogy portrays an inept spy, while the 1985 movie Spies Like Us depicts a pair of none-too-bright men sent to the Soviet Union to investigate a missile. The historical novel The Emperor and the Spy highlights the adventurous life of U.S. Colonel Sidney Forrester Mashbir, who during the 1920s and 1930s attempted to prevent war with Japan, and when war did erupt, he became General MacArthur's top advisor in the Pacific Theater of World War Two.[45][46] Black Widow is also a fictional agent who was introduced as a Russian spy, an antagonist of the superhero Iron Man. She later became an agent of the fictional spy agency S.H.I.E.L.D. and a member of the superhero team the Avengers. 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Illegal Archived January 6, 2011, at the Wayback Machine Mi5.gov. "How spies operate". "CIA Status Improves Contractor's Case for Immunity". New America Media. Archived from the original on 2013-11-02. Retrieved 2013-08-17. treason Archived December 3, 2012, at the Wayback Machine "espionage". Archived from the original on 3 December 2012. spying Archived December 3, 2012, at the Wayback Machine "Aldrich Ames Criminal Complaint". jya.com. Archived from the original on 2011-05-13. Retrieved 2011-03-19. "USA v. Robert Philip Hanssen: Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint, Arrest Warrant and Search Warrant". fas.org. Retrieved 2011-03-19. "Aldrich Hazen Ames Register Number: 40087-083". Bop.gov. Federal Bureau of Prisons. Archived from the original on 2012-09-19. Retrieved 2014-01-03. (Search result) "FBI – Aldrich Hazen Ames". FBI. Archived from the original on 2010-10-13. "Robert Hanssen, F.B.I. Agent Exposed as Spy for Moscow, Dies at 79". The New York Times. Retrieved 5 June 2023. Gerstein, Josh (2011-03-07). "Obama's hard line on leaks". politico.com. Retrieved 2011-03-19. See the article on John Kiriakou Your World: The Nowhere Man Archived 2019-09-15 at the Wayback Machine, Rupa Jha, October 21, 2012, BBC (retrieved 2012-10-20) (Program link:The Nowhere Man) "Espionage and the law | MI5 - the Security Service". Archived from the original on 2014-09-25. Retrieved 2014-08-19. "What is espionage? | MI5 - the Security Service". Archived from the original on 2013-11-01. Retrieved 2013-08-16. "Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907". International Committee of the Red Cross. Paul Battersby; Joseph M. Siracusa; Sasho Ripiloski (2011). Crime Wars: The Global Intersection of Crime, Political Violence, and International Law. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 125. Charlesworth, Lorie (2006). "2 SAS Regiment, War Crimes Investigations, and British Intelligence: Intelligence Officials and the Natzweiler Trial". The Journal of Intelligence History. 6 (2): 41. doi:10.1080/16161262.2006.10555131. S2CID 156655154. "United States of America, Practice Relating to Rule 62. Improper Use of Flags or Military Emblems, Insignia or Uniforms of the Adversary". International Committee of the Red Cross. 2006 Operational Law Handbook. DIANE. 2010. ISBN 9781428910676. Leslie C. Green (2000). The Contemporary Law Of Armed Conflict 2nd Edition. Juris Publishing, Inc. p. 142. ISBN 978-1-929446-03-2. George P. Fletcher (September 16, 2002). Romantics at War: Glory and Guilt in the Age of Terrorism. Princeton University Press. p. 106. ISBN 9780691006512. J. H. W. Verziji (1978). International Law in Historical Perspective: The laws of war. Part IX-A. Brill Publishers. p. 143. ISBN 978-90-286-0148-2. "UCMJ – Article 106 – Spies". About.com US Military. Archived from the original on 2013-05-15. Brett F. Woods, Neutral Ground: A Political History of Espionage Fiction (2008) online Archived 2019-03-27 at the Wayback Machine Miller, Toby, Spyscreen: Espionage on Film and TV from the 1930s to the 1960s (Oxford University Press, 2003). Katz, Stan S. (2019). "The Emperor and the Spy". TheEmperorAndTheSpy.com. Archived from the original on 2019-09-26. Katz, Stan S. (2019). The Emperor and the Spy. Horizon Productions. ISBN 978-0-9903349-4-1. Works cited Johnson, John (1997). The Evolution of British Sigint, 1653–1939. London: HMSO. OCLC 52130886. Winkler, Jonathan Reed (July 2009). "Information Warfare in World War I". The Journal of Military History. 73 (3): 845–867. doi:10.1353/jmh.0.0324. ISSN 1543-7795. S2CID 201749182. Further reading Aldrich, Richard J., and Christopher Andrew, eds. Secret Intelligence: A Reader (2nd ed. 2018); focus on the 21st century; reprints 30 essays by scholars. excerpt Andrew, Christopher, The Secret World: A History of Intelligence, 2018. Burnham, Frederick Russell, Taking Chances, 1944. Felix, Christopher [pseudonym for James McCarger] Intelligence Literature: Suggested Reading List. US CIA. Retrieved September 2, 2012.[dead link] A Short Course in the Secret War, 4th Edition. Madison Books, November 19, 2001. Friedman, George. America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between the United States and Its Enemies 2005 Gopnik, Adam, "Spy vs. Spy vs. Spy: How valuable is espionage?", The New Yorker, 2 September 2019, pp. 53–59. "There seems to be a paranoid paradox of espionage: the better your intelligence, the dumber your conduct; the more you know, the less you anticipate.... Hard-won information is ignored or wildly misinterpreted.... [It] happens again and again [that] a seeming national advance in intelligence is squandered through cross-bred confusion, political rivalry, mutual bureaucratic suspicions, intergovernmental competition, and fear of the press (as well as leaks to the press), all seasoned with dashes of sexual jealousy and adulterous intrigue." (p. 54.) Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. In Spies, We Trust: The Story of Western Intelligence (2013), covers U.S. and Britain Jenkins, Peter. Surveillance Tradecraft: The Professional's Guide to Surveillance Training ISBN 978-0-9535378-2-2 Kahn, David, The Codebreakers: The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication from Ancient Times to the Internet, 1996 revised edition. First published 1967. Keegan, John, Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda, 2003. Knightley, Phillip, The Second Oldest Profession: Spies and Spying in the Twentieth Century, Norton, 1986. Lerner, Brenda Wilmoth & K. Lee Lerner, eds. Terrorism: essential primary sources Thomas Gale 2006 ISBN 978-1-4144-0621-3 Lerner, K. Lee and Brenda Wilmoth Lerner, eds. Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence and Security (2003), worldwide recent coverage 1100 pages. May, Ernest R. (ed.). Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars (1984). O'Toole, George. Honorable Treachery: A History of U.S. Intelligence, Espionage, Covert Action from the American Revolution to the CIA 1991 Murray, Williamson, and Allan Reed Millett, eds. Calculations: net assessment and the coming of World War II (1992). Owen, David. Hidden Secrets: A Complete History of Espionage and the Technology Used to Support It Richelson, Jeffery T. A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (1977) Richelson, Jeffery T. The U.S. Intelligence Community (1999, fourth edition) Smith, W. Thomas Jr. Encyclopedia of the Central Intelligence Agency (2003) Tuchman, Barbara W., The Zimmermann Telegram, New York, Macmillan, 1962. Warner, Michael. The Rise and Fall of Intelligence: An International Security History (2014) Zegart, Amy B. Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence (2022), university textbook.

How the CIA worked with the Mafia to assassinate foreign leaders: https://thememoryhole.substack.com/p/anything-can-come-back-to-haunt-us How the FBI got corrupted by the Mafia: https://thememoryhole.substack.com/p/working-with-made-men?utm_source=profile&utm_medium=reader2 "ON COMPANY BUSINESS (PART I)" is an extensive and unflinching examination of the Central Intelligence Agency. Allan Francovich's award-winning documentary, crafted over five years of meticulous research, provides a comprehensive overview of the CIA's operations. Delving into the highest echelons of policy-making, front organizations, field operations, and their impact, this film paints a disturbing yet revealing picture of the agency's actions worldwide. Spanning three hours, the documentary eschews a narrative voice, letting archival footage, interviews, and firsthand accounts speak volumes. Former CIA personnel, including directors and whistleblowers, offer insights into the agency's workings, alongside voices of individuals directly affected by CIA operations. In its initial part, the film explores the agency's inception, showcasing government officials' manipulations, deceit, and armed interventions in countries like Guatemala and Cuba. It unearths assassination plots against political leaders and illuminates the controversial collaboration between the CIA and the Mafia. Released in December 1983, this groundbreaking documentary challenges viewers with its dense information and poignant portrayal of the consequences of covert operations. It stands as a powerful testament to the complexities and repercussions of CIA actions, prompting reflection and examination of its role in global affairs. Salvatore Mooney Giancana[1] (/dʒiɑːnˈkɑːnə/; born Gilormo Giangana;[nb 1] Italian: [dʒiˈlɔrmo dʒaŋˈɡaːna]; May 24, 1908[nb 2] – June 19, 1975) was an American mobster who was boss of the Chicago Outfit from 1957 to 1966. Giancana was born in Chicago to Italian immigrant parents. He joined the 42 Gang as a teenager, developing a reputation in organized crime, which gained him the notice of the leaders of the Chicago Outfit, which he joined during the late 1930s. From the 1940s through the 1950s, he controlled illegal gambling, illegal liquor distribution, and political rackets in Louisiana. In the early 1940s, Giancana was involved in Chicago's African-American lottery payout system for the Outfit. In 1957, he became the boss of the Chicago Outfit. According to some sources, Giancana and the Mafia were involved in John F. Kennedy's victory in the 1960 presidential election. During the 1960s, he was recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in a plot to assassinate Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Conspiracy theorists consider Giancana, along with Mafia leaders Santo Trafficante Jr. and Carlos Marcello, to be associated with the assassination of John F. Kennedy. In 1965, Giancana was convicted of contempt of court, serving one year in prison. After his release from prison, Giancana fled to Cuernavaca, Mexico. In 1974, he was deported to the United States, returning to Chicago. Giancana was murdered on June 19, 1975, in Oak Park, Illinois, shortly before he was scheduled to appear before the Church Committee. Early life Giancana was born Gilormo Giangana[nb 1] on May 24, 1908,[nb 2] in The Patch neighborhood of Chicago to Antonio Giangana and Antonia DeSimmona,[nb 3] Italian immigrants from Castelvetrano, Sicily, Italy. His father immigrated in 1905, while his mother immigrated in 1906;[7] he had seven siblings.[2] Antonia died in 1910 and his father married Mary Leonardi.[8] On September 23, 1933, Giancana married Angeline DeTolve, the daughter of immigrants from the Italian region of Basilicata. They had three daughters: Antoinette, born 1935; Bonnie, born 1938; and Francine, born 1945.[2] Angeline died on April 23, 1954, leaving him to raise his daughters.[9][2] Criminal career Giancana joined the 42 Gang, a juvenile street crew working for political boss Joseph Esposito. The 42 Gang's name was a reference to Ali Baba and the 40 Thieves. They thought they were one better, hence 42. Giancana soon developed a reputation as an excellent getaway driver, a high earner, and a vicious killer. After Esposito's murder, in which Giancana was allegedly involved, the 42 Gang was transformed into a de facto extension of the Chicago Outfit with leaders such as Frank "the Enforcer" Nitti, Paul "the Waiter" Ricca, and Tony "Joe Batters" Accardo. He was first arrested in 1925 for auto theft. He soon graduated to "triggerman" and by the age of 20 had been the prime subject of three murder investigations but never tried for any of them.[10] In 1929, Giancana was convicted of burglary and larceny, and sentenced to one to five years in the Joliet Correctional Center. He was released in 1932 after serving three years and nine months.[11] During the late 1930s, Giancana became the first 42er to join the Chicago Outfit. From the early 1940s through the 1950s, he controlled most illegal gambling, liquor distribution, and other political rackets in Louisiana through longtime friend H. A. (Hol) Killian. Killian controlled the majority of the liquor license issuance by his associations with longtime New Orleans business associate Carlos Marcello.[citation needed] In 1939, Giancana was convicted of bootlegging and sentenced to four years in Leavenworth Prison and Terre Haute Federal Correctional Complex.[11] Rise to power After his release from prison in 1942, Giancana made a name for himself by convincing Accardo, then the Outfit's underboss, to stage a takeover of Chicago's African-American "policy" (lottery) payout system for the Outfit. Giancana's crew is believed to have convinced Eddie Jones to quit his racket and leave the country. Giancana's crew was also responsible for the August 4, 1952 murder of African-American gambling boss Theodore Roe. Jones and Roe were major South Side gambling bosses. Roe had refused to surrender control of his operation as the Outfit had demanded, and on June 19, 1951, Roe fatally shot Leonard "Fat Lennie" Caifano, a made man of Giancana's crew.[12] The Outfit's South Side "policy"-game takeover was not complete until another Outfit member, Jackie "the Lackey" Cerone, scared "Big Jim" Martin to Mexico with two bullets to the head that did not kill him. When the lottery money started rolling in for the Outfit after this gambling war, the amount this game produced for the Outfit was in the millions of dollars a year, bringing Giancana further notice. It is believed to have been a major factor in his being "anointed" as the Outfit's new boss in 1957. Accardo joined Ricca in semi-retirement, becoming the Outfit's consigliere.[13] However, it was generally understood that Accardo and Ricca still had the real power. Giancana was required to consult Accardo and Ricca on all important Outfit affairs. Giancana was present at the Mafia's 1957 Apalachin meeting at the Upstate New York estate of Joseph Barbara.[14] Later, Buffalo crime boss Stefano Magaddino and Giancana were overheard on a wiretap saying the meeting should have occurred in the Chicago area. Giancana claimed that the Chicago area was "the safest place in the world" for a major underworld meeting because he had several police chiefs on his payroll. If the syndicate ever wanted to hold a meeting in or around Chicago, Giancana said, they had nothing to fear because they had the area "locked up tight".[15] Some journalists claimed that Giancana and his Chicago crime syndicate "played a role" in John F. Kennedy's victory in the 1960 presidential election.[16][17] Hyman Larner was an associate of Giancana's who helped expand the Outfit's gambling and smuggling operations to Panama and Iran,[18] moving the Miami operation's headquarters to Panama where money laundering was more easily facilitated by local banks. These operations were conducted as a partnership between the Mafia and the CIA. By 1966, this partnership had developed into arms smuggling to the Middle East for the Israeli Mossad, all via Panama.[19] Richard Cain, a corrupt police officer, also made "frequent trips" to and from Mexico as Giancana's courier and financial adviser.[20] Alleged CIA connections It is widely reputed and was partially corroborated by the Church Committee hearings that during the Kennedy administration, the CIA recruited Giancana and other mobsters to assassinate Fidel Castro. Giancana reportedly said that CIA and the Cosa Nostra were "different sides of the same coin".[21] Judith Exner claimed to be the mistress of both Giancana and JFK, and that she delivered communications between them about Castro.[22] Giancana's daughter Antoinette has stated that her father was performing a scam to pocket millions of CIA dollars.[23] Documents released in 1997 revealed that some Mafiosi worked with CIA on assassination attempts against Castro.[24] CIA documents released in 2007 confirmed that in September 1960, the CIA recruited ex-FBI agent Robert Maheu to meet with the West Coast representative of the Chicago mob, Johnny Roselli. When Maheu contacted Roselli, Maheu hid that he was sent by the CIA, instead portraying himself as an advocate for international corporations. He offered $150,000 to have Castro killed, but Roselli refused any pay. Roselli introduced Maheu to two men he called Sam Gold and Joe. "Sam Gold" was Giancana; "Joe" was Santo Trafficante Jr., the Tampa syndicate boss and one of the most powerful mobsters in prerevolution Cuba.[25] Glenn Kessler of The Washington Post explained: "After Fidel Castro led a revolution that toppled the government of Fulgencio Batista in 1959, CIA was desperate to eliminate Castro. So, the agency sought out a partner equally worried about Castro—the Mafia, which had lucrative investments in Cuban casinos."[26] According to the declassified CIA "Family Jewels" documents, Giancana and Trafficante were contacted in September 1960 about the possibility of an assassination attempt by Maheu after Maheu had contacted Roselli, a Mafia member in Las Vegas and Giancana's number-two man. Maheu had presented himself as a representative of numerous international businesses in Cuba that Castro was expropriating. He offered $150,000 for the "removal" of Castro through this operation, though the documents suggest that neither Roselli, Giancana, nor Trafficante accepted any payment for the job. Giancana suggested using poison pills to dose Castro's food and drink. CIA gave these pills to Giancana's nominee, Juan Orta, whom Giancana presented as a corrupt official in the new Cuban government and who had access to Castro. After six attempts to introduce the poison into Castro's food, Orta abruptly demanded to be relieved of his role in the mission, giving the job to another, unnamed participant. Later, Giancana and Trafficante made a second attempt using Anthony Verona, the commander of the Cuban Exile Junta, who had, according to Trafficante, become "disaffected with the apparent ineffectual progress of the Junta." Verona requested $10,000 in expenses and $1,000 worth of communications equipment. How much work was performed for the second attempt is unknown, as the program was canceled soon after due to the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961.[27][28][29] According to the "Family Jewels", Giancana asked Maheu to wire the room of his then mistress Phyllis McGuire, singer of the McGuire Sisters, whom he suspected of having an affair with comedian Dan Rowan. Although documents suggest Maheu acquiesced, the device was not planted because the agent who had been given the task of planting it was arrested. According to the documents, Robert F. Kennedy prohibited the prosecution of the agent and Maheu, who was soon linked to the wire attempt, at the CIA's request.[29] Giancana and McGuire, who had a long-lasting affair, were originally introduced by Frank Sinatra.[30] According to Antoinette Giancana, during part of the affair, McGuire had a concurrent affair with President Kennedy.[31] Downfall When Giancana was called before a grand jury on June 1, 1965, he remained silent despite having been granted immunity, which resulted in his jailing for contempt for more than a year, the duration of the grand jury.[32] Meanwhile, Giancana was deposed as operational boss by Ricca and Accardo, and replaced by Joseph "Joey Doves" Aiuppa.[33] After his release from prison in 1966, Giancana fled to Cuernavaca, Mexico, to avoid further grand jury questioning.[34][35] He was arrested by Mexican authorities on July 19, 1974, and deported to the United States.[34][35] He arrived back in Chicago on July 21, 1974.[36] Death Giancana mausoleum at Mount Carmel Cemetery After Giancana's return to the United States, police detailed officers to guard his house in Oak Park, Illinois, but on the night of June 19, 1975, shortly before he was scheduled to appear before the Church Committee,[37] which was investigating CIA and Cosa Nostra collusion,[38] a gunman entered the home through the basement and shot Giancana in the head and neck seven times with a .22 caliber pistol. At around 11 p.m., Joseph DiPersio, Giancana's caretaker, found his body on the floor of the basement kitchen where he was said to be frying sausage and peppers.[39][40] A week before his death, Giancana had gall bladder surgery in Houston.[39] Giancana was interred next to his wife, Angeline, in a family mausoleum at Mount Carmel Cemetery, in Hillside, Illinois. Within days of Giancana's murder, Michael J. Corbitt, the police chief of Willow Springs, Illinois, and a mobster associate, was told by Chicago Outfit's capo Salvatore Bastone that "Sam sure loved that little guy in Oak Park... Tony Spilotro. Yeah, he was fuckin' crazy about him. Sam put Tony on the fuckin' map, thought he was gonna be a big fuckin' man someday. Did you know that after Marshall Caifano got out of Vegas, it was Sam who wanted Tony Spilotro out there? Even lately, with all the problems with the skim and all, Sam always stood behind the guy. Tony was over to Sam's house all the time. He lived right by there. Did you know Tony even figured out a way where he could get in through the back of Sam's place without anybody seeing him? He'd go through other people's yards, go over fences, all sorts of shit."[41] When Corbitt asked for the reason for the murder, Bastone quipped, "There's never just one reason for shit like what happened to Sam. There's a million of 'em. Let's just say that Sam should've remembered what happened to Bugsy Siegel."[41] Other theories Although longtime associate Dominic "Butch" Blasi was with Giancana the night he was murdered and questioned by police as a suspect, neither the FBI nor Antoinette Giancana considers him Giancana's killer.[42][43] Hitman Nicholas Calabrese told the FBI during the 2000s that he knew that Tony Accardo was part of the killing and Angelo LaPietra got rid of the gun which used a suppressor made by Frank Calabrese Sr. and Ronnie Jarret.[44] Another theory is that Santo Trafficante Jr. ordered Giancana's murder due to fears he would testify about the Mafia's involvement in CIA plots to kill Castro. Although Trafficante would have needed permission from Outfit bosses Accardo and Joseph Aiuppa, Giancana's murder coincided with the discovery of the decomposing remains of Johnny Roselli in an oil drum floating off Miami; he had been shot and chopped up before being dumped in the sea. Some suspected that Roselli was killed on Trafficante's orders.[45] There were rumors that the CIA may have killed Giancana because of his links to the Agency.[citation needed]. Former CIA Director William Colby said, "We had nothing to do with it."[46] John Whitten mentioned during the Scelso deposition that he suspected William Harvey, a CIA assassin who was in the area. In popular culture Movies Giancana played a major role in the J. X. Williams movie Peep Show (1965). The TV film Mafia Princess (1986) starring Tony Curtis as Giancana. News footage of Giancana is featured in the movie JFK (1991). Carmine Caridi played Giancana in the movie Ruby (1992). The HBO made-for-TV movie Sugartime (1995) depicts Giancana's relationship with singer Phyllis McGuire with Giancana played by John Turturro. Robert Miranda played Giancana in the television movie The Rat Pack (1998). Peter Friedman played Giancana in the movie Power and Beauty (2002). In the movie The Good Shepherd (2006), the character played by Joe Pesci, Joseph Palmi, was a mix of several mobsters, including Giancana, Santo Trafficante Jr., and Carlos Marcello, who were involved with the CIA's operation Family Jewels. Matt Damon's character, Edward Wilson, is depicted proposing that Palmi assist in assassinating Castro. Al Linea plays Giancana in the movie The Irishman (2019). Television Giancana features in the first episode of the documentary series Mafia's Greatest Hits, on the UK history TV channel Yesterday.[47] Rod Steiger portrayed Giancana in the TV miniseries Sinatra (1992). Serge Houde portrays Giancana as a major nemesis of the Kennedy family in the television miniseries The Kennedys (2011). The character Mob Man (uncredited) from The X-Files episode "Musings of a Cigarette Smoking Man", who is present at a planning meeting on the assassination of JFK, is likely based on Giancana. Giancana is portrayed by Emmett Skilton in the 8-part AMC television miniseries The Making of the Mob: Chicago (2016). Giancana's image is included in the opening credits of the Starz TV series Magic City (2012–13). Giancana is seen and referenced at a Las Vegas casino in the TV series Timeless in the episode Atomic City (2016). Literature Giancana is a major character in Max Allan Collins's novels Chicago Confidential and Road to Paradise. Giancana plays a major role in James Ellroy's fiction, most notably American Tabloid and its sequels The Cold Six Thousand and Blood's a Rover. Giancana is the subject of the biography Mafia Princess, written by his daughter Antoinette. Giancana is a character in Robert J. Randisi's Rat Pack novels.[citation needed] Giancana is a notable character in Norman Mailer's 1991 historical fiction Harlot's Ghost. The book Double Cross: The Explosive, Inside Story of the Mobster Who Controlled America tells the story of Giancana's life. Written by his brother Chuck Giancana, and his godson and namesake Sam Giancana, the book includes revelations about the deaths of JFK, Marilyn Monroe, and RFK.[48] Giancana is mentioned in Charles Brandt's narrative nonfiction book I Heard You Paint Houses (2004). The fictional character Louie Russo in Mark Winegardner's 2004 novel The Godfather Returns may be based on Giancana. Giancana is a character in Robert Littell's 2002 CIA novel The Company. The fictional character "Sam" in Steve Peters and Kay Stephens's novel The Outlaw Sandra Love (2013)[49] is based on Giancana.[citation needed] In the 2013 novel The Outlaw, the protagonist Sandra Love is said to have had a four-year relationship with a man named Sam, the head of the Chicago Outfit during the early 1960s. Music Influential rapper Kool G Rap once stated that the "G" in his name stands for Giancana. Kool G Rap released an album called The Giancana Story (2002). Giancana may be mentioned in the Shyne song "Edge", on his second album, Godfather Buried Alive. "Fuck comma rap's, Sam Giancana", although this is sometimes rendered as "same G and canna". Giancana is mentioned in the song "Dope money" by The Lox ("Bring Drama 'cause Giancana got Kennedy Killed") on the album Ryde or Die Vol. 1. See also List of organized crime killings in Illinois List of unsolved murders Notes Gilormo Giangana is the birth name according to the Chicago Bureau of Vital Statistics, Birth Certificate Number 5915,[2][3] however, Momo Salvatore Giancana (Italian: [ˈmɔːmo salvaˈtoːre dʒaŋˈkaːna]) is the birth name according to Birth Register Certificate Number 1191.[2] May 24, 1908, is the birth date according to the Chicago Bureau of Vital Statistics, Birth Certificate Number 5915,[4] however, June 15, 1908, is the birth date according to Birth Register Certificate Number 1191, and the birth date Giancana celebrated.[5][2] Antonino Giangana and Antonia DiSimonna are the names according to the Chicago Bureau of Vital Statistics, Birth Certificate Number 5915,[2][6] however, Antonio Giancana and Antonia DiSimone, are the names according to Birth Register Certificate Number 1191.[2] References Giancana, Sam; Giancana, Chuck; Giancana, Bettina (March 20, 1992). Double Cross: The Explosive, Inside Story of the Mobster Who Controlled America. p. 242. ISBN 9780446516242. "We want name our son after you... Samuel Mooney Giancana." "Sam Giancana" (PDF). Federal Bureau of Investigation. September 12, 1960. Archived from the original (PDF) on December 27, 2020. Retrieved June 9, 2020. Giancana, Antoinette; Renner, Thomas C. (1984). Mafia Princess: Growing Up in Sam Giancana's Family. Morrow. p. 30. ISBN 0-380-69849-8. Giancana, Antoinette; Renner, Thomas C. (1984). Mafia Princess: Growing Up in Sam Giancana's Family. Morrow. p. 30. ISBN 0-380-69849-8. Giancana, Antoinette; Renner, Thomas C. (1984). Mafia Princess: Growing Up in Sam Giancana's Family. Morrow. ISBN 0-380-69849-8. Giancana, Antoinette; Renner, Thomas C. (1984). Mafia Princess: Growing Up in Sam Giancana's Family. Morrow. p. 30. ISBN 0-380-69849-8. Giancana, Antoinette; Renner, Thomas C. (1984). Mafia Princess: Growing Up in Sam Giancana's Family. Morrow. ISBN 0-380-69849-8. Giancana, Antoinette; Renner, Thomas C. (1984). Mafia Princess: Growing Up in Sam Giancana's Family. Morrow. ISBN 0-380-69849-8. Giancana, Antoinette; Renner, Thomas C. (1984). Mafia Princess: Growing Up in Sam Giancana's Family. Morrow. ISBN 0-380-69849-8. "Sam Giancana on Biography.com". biography.com. Archived from the original on April 10, 2019. Retrieved May 24, 2017. Congress, United States (1960). Reports and Documents, Volume 27. p. 816. Retrieved June 15, 2020 – via Google Books. "Investigator Salinger testified to Giancana's criminal record: In 1929 he was convicted of burglary-larceny, and sentenced to 1 to 5 years in the Joliet Penitentiary. In 1939, he was convicted of conspiracy to violate the Internal Revenue laws related to liquor and was sentenced to 4 years and fined $2,700. He served, of that 4-year-sentence, 3 years and 2 months in Leavenworth and Terre Haute Federal Penitentiaries." Chepesiuk, Ron (2007). Black Gangsters of Chicago. Barricade Books. p. 95. ISBN 9781569803318. Roemer, William F. Jr. (1995). Accardo: The Genuine Godfather. D.I. Fine. pp. 125–129. ISBN 978-1-55611-467-0. Giancana, Antoinette; Renner, Thomas C. (1984). Mafia Princess: Growing Up in Sam Giancana's Family. Morrow. pp. 190–195–197. ISBN 0-380-69849-8. Sifakis, Carl (1987). The Mafia Encyclopedia. New York City: Facts on File. ISBN 0-8160-1856-1. Retrieved March 17, 2020. Greenberg, David (October 16, 2000). "Was Nixon Robbed?". Slate. Archived from the original on September 8, 2011. Retrieved March 17, 2020. "Sinatra was 'go-between for Mafia and JFK'". The Guardian. October 7, 2000. Archived from the original on April 15, 2018. Retrieved April 16, 2018. Gibson, Ray (February 18, 2003). "'Double' life: Dealing with the mob, CIA". Chicago Tribune. Archived from the original on November 7, 2018. Retrieved June 8, 2020. Giancana 2004, pp. 113–115 "Cain played mob game and lost big". Chicago Tribune. December 21, 1973. pp. 1–8. Giancana, Sam; Giancana, Chuck; Giancana, Bettina (March 20, 1992). Double Cross: The Explosive, Inside Story of the Mobster Who Controlled America. p. 215. ISBN 9780446516242. O'Brien, Michael (December 1, 1999). "The Exner File. (Judith Campbell Exner, John F. Kennedy's mistress)". Washington Monthly. Archived from the original on March 11, 2008. Retrieved March 17, 2020. Television documentary Mafia Women, Discovery Channel. "CIA offered mafia $150,000 to kill Castro". 1997. Retrieved June 15, 2020. "The CIA offered $150,000 to have Cuban leader Fidel Castro assassinated in the early 1960s, but the mob insisted on taking the job for free, according to a newly declassified document." "MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence; SUBJECT: ROSELLI, Johnny" (PDF). The New York Times. June 26, 2007. Retrieved March 17, 2020. "he agreed to introduce him a friend, Sam Gold, who knew the "Cuban crowd". Roselli made it clear he did not want any money for his part and believed Sam would feel the same way. Neither of these individuals was ever paid out of Augency funds. During the week of September 25, Maheu was introduced to Sam who was staying at the Fontainebleau Hotel, Miami Beach. It was several weeks after his meeting with Sam and Joe, [...] They were identified as Momo Salvatore Giancana and Santos Trafficant, respectively." Kessler, Glenn (June 27, 2007). "Trying to Kill Fidel Castro". The Washington Post. Washington, D.C. Archived from the original on October 28, 2013. Retrieved May 23, 2013. Holland, Steve; Sullivan, Andy (June 26, 2007). "CIA tried to get Mafia to kill Castro". Reuters. Archived from the original on April 29, 2008. Retrieved March 17, 2020. Blanton, Thomas (June 26, 2007). ""Family Jewels" Archive". National Security Archive. Archived from the original on May 3, 2008. Retrieved March 17, 2020. Johnson, M. Alex (June 27, 2006). "CIA opens the book on a shady past Declassified 'family jewels' detail assassination plots, break-ins, wiretaps". NBC News. Archived from the original on October 27, 2017. Retrieved March 17, 2020. Giancana, Antoinette; Renner, Thomas C. (1984). Mafia Princess: Growing Up in Sam Giancana's Family. Morrow. pp. 259–284, 287–293, 347–348. ISBN 0-380-69849-8. Giancana, Antoinette; Renner, Thomas C. (1984). Mafia Princess: Growing Up in Sam Giancana's Family. Morrow. p. 179. ISBN 0-380-69849-8. "In Re Grand Jury Investigation of Sam Giancana, Appellant.in the Matter of the Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Sam Giancana, Appellant, v. United States of America, Appellee, 352 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1965)". US Law, Case Law, Codes, Statutes & Regulations. October 8, 1965. Archived from the original on September 12, 2015. Retrieved March 17, 2020. "Sam Giancana has appealed, in case No. 15178, from an order of the district court entered June 1, 1965, adjudging him in contempt of court for failure to obey an order of that court dated June 1, 1965, and he has also appealed, in case No. 15179, from an order of that court entered June 2, 1965, denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus." Sifakis, Carl (2005). The Mafia Encyclopedia. Infobase Publishing. p. 6. ISBN 978-0-8160-6989-7. "Crime boss' death linked to his discomfiture to mob". The Spokesman-Review. Vol. 93, no. 38. Spokane, Washington. June 21, 1975. p. 16. Archived from the original on January 25, 2016. Retrieved October 30, 2015. "After his release from prison, Giancana stepped down and left Chicago's mob in the hands of his former boss, Accardo, himself going into self-imposed exile in Cuernavaca, Mexico to avoid more grand jury questioning. [...] In July 19, 1974, Mexican police ended his fling, grabbing the pajamlad Giancana while he tended his tomatoes plants They dumped across the orders of the FBI agents (LAT-WP)" Glionna, John M. (November 21, 2014). "Sam Giancana's daughter aims to cash in on gangster's memorabilia". Los Angeles Times. Archived from the original on November 21, 2014. Retrieved October 30, 2014. "Giancana lived most of his final years in Mexico, on the lam from federal authorities, but was deported back to the U.S. in 1974." Michael Branigan (2011). A History of Chicago's O'Hare Airport. The History Press. pp. 134. ISBN 978-1-60949-434-6. Archived from the original on January 25, 2016. Retrieved January 1, 2016. Cronkite, Walter; Lovejoy, Sharron; Schorr, Daniel (June 20, 1975). "GIANCANA KILLED". CBS News. Safire, William (December 31, 1975). "Murder Most Foul". The Times-News. Archived from the original on March 7, 2016. Retrieved January 1, 2016. King, Seth S. (June 21, 1975). "Giancana, Gangster, Slain; Tied to C.I.A. Castro Plot". The New York Times. p. 1. Retrieved June 15, 2020. "According to the Oak Park police, Joseph DiPersio, the caretaker, [...] went to the basement, he found the gangster lying face up in a pool of blood on the floor of the kitchen. Six .22‐caliber shell cases were found near the body. [...] Recently he underwent gall bladder surgery at the Methodist Hospital in Houston. The authorities said that he returned to Chicago only this week." Goudie, Chuck (June 20, 2015). "ABC7 I-Team: Chicago mobster Sam Giancana's 40-year-old murder still a mystery". abc7chicago.com. Archived from the original on April 22, 2018. Retrieved June 8, 2020. "On June 19, 1975, Giancana invited a friend in his home for sausage and peppers. Before the meat was done, that man would become Giancana's killer. The 67-year-old top hoodlum was shot in the head and neck as he fried up the evening snack, seven shots fired from a silencer-equipped .22 caliber pistol." Corbitt, Michael J. (2003). Double Deal: The Inside Story of Murder, Unbridled Corruption, and the Cop who was a Mobster. p. 196. ISBN 9780060195854. Retrieved June 15, 2020. Giancana, Antoinette; Renner, Thomas C. (1984). Mafia Princess: Growing Up in Sam Giancana's Family. Morrow. p. 367. ISBN 0-380-69849-8. Congress 1983, p. 182 Family Secrets: The Case That Crippled the Chicago Mob C., G. (August 23, 1976). "Deep Six for Johnny" (PDF). Time. pp. 23–25. Archived (PDF) from the original on March 4, 2016. Retrieved February 27, 2018. "Alameda Fratianno was Roselli's protégé because Roselli introduced Fratianno to the NY mob, and so Roselli was responsible for Fratianno's actions and because Fratianno was an informant, Roselli's death could have been a consequence of Fratianno's informing." Godwin, John (1978). Murder U.S.A.: The Ways We Kill Each Other. Ballantine Books. p. 145. ISBN 978-0-345-27721-3. "Mafia's Greatest Hits (series 1)". televisioncatchup.co.uk. Archived from the original on June 18, 2015. Retrieved June 17, 2015. Giancana, Sam; Giancana, Chuck; Giancana, Bettina (March 20, 1992). Double Cross: The Explosive, Inside Story of the Mobster Who Controlled America. Grand Central Publishing. ISBN 9780446516242. Retrieved March 17, 2020. Peters, Steve (2013). The Outlaw Sandra Love. Star Hill Publishing. ISBN 9780615760315. Archived from the original on January 6, 2019. Retrieved March 17, 2020. Further reading Giancana, Sam; Giancana, Chuck; Giancana, Bettina (March 20, 1992). Double Cross: The Explosive, Inside Story of the Mobster Who Controlled America. ISBN 9780446516242. Retrieved March 17, 2020. Giancana, Antoinette; Renner, Thomas C. (1984). Mafia Princess: Growing Up in Sam Giancana's Family. Morrow. ISBN 0-380-69849-8. Retrieved March 17, 2020. Godwin, John (1978). Murder U.S.A.: The Ways We Kill Each Other. Ballantine Books. ISBN 978-0-345-27721-3. Retrieved March 17, 2020. Roemer, William F. Jr. (1995). Accardo: The Genuine Godfather. D.I. Fine. ISBN 978-1-55611-467-0. Retrieved March 17, 2020. Organized Crime in Chicago: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Ninety-eighth Congress, First Session, March 4, 1983. U.S. Government Printing Office. March 4, 1983. Retrieved March 17, 2020. Brashler, William (1977). The Don: The Life and Death of Sam Giancana. New York: Harper and Row. ISBN 0-06-010447-3. Cain, Michael J. (2007). The Tangled Web. New York: Skyhorse Publishing. ISBN 978-1-60239-044-7. Dark, Tony (2004). The FBI Files Sam Giancana. Chicago: H H Productions. ISBN 0-615-12720-7. Hersh, Seymour M. (1997). Dark Side of Camelot. New York: Little, Brown and Company. ISBN 0-316-35955-6. Inserra, Vincent L. (2014). C-1 and the Chicago Mob. Xlibris. ISBN 978-1-4931-8278-7.[self-published source] Morgan, John M. (1985). Prince of Crime. New York: Stein and Day. ISBN 0-8128-8297-0. Nash, Jay Robert (1973). Bloodletters and Badmen. New York: M. Evans & Co. ISBN 0-87131-777-X. Sifakis, Carl (1982). Encyclopedia of Crime. New York: Facts On File. ISBN 0-8160-5694-3. Talbot, David (2007). Brothers: The Hidden History of the Kennedy Years. Free Press. ISBN 978-0-7432-6918-6. Thompson, Nathan (2003). Kings: The True Story of Chicago's Policy Kings and Numbers Racketeers: an Informal History. The Bronzeville Press. ISBN 0-9724875-0-6. Zion, Sidney (1994). Loyalty and Betrayal: The Story of the American Mob. San Francisco: Collins Publishers. ISBN 0-00-638271-1.

The dark side of history: https://thememoryhole.substack.com/ United States Army Counterintelligence (ACI) is the component of United States Army Military Intelligence which conducts counterintelligence activities to detect, identify, assess, counter, exploit and/or neutralize adversarial, foreign intelligence services, international terrorist organizations, and insider threats to the United States Army and U.S. Department of Defense (DoD).[1] Overview ACI is one of only three DoD Counterintelligence (CI) entities designated by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, as a "Military Department CI Organization" or "MDCO."[2] The other two DoD MDCO's are the Department of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI) and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS). As an MDCO, Special Agents of ACI are recognized federal law enforcement officers tasked with conducting criminal CI investigations in conjunction with other CI activities. Other CI entities within the DoD not recognized as MDCOs, such as Marine Corps Counterintelligence and the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) have no direct criminal investigative mission and therefore are designated only as "intelligence" or "security" organizations; although they may assist in such investigations in a non-law enforcement capacity as authorized by Executive Order 12333 and applicable regulations. ACI Special Agents are U.S. Army personnel, either military or civilian, who are trained and appointed to conduct CI investigations and operations for the U.S. Army and DoD. As federal law enforcement officers who are issued badge and credentials, they have apprehension authority and jurisdiction in the investigation of national security crimes committed by Army personnel including treason, spying, espionage, sedition, subversion, sabotage or assassination directed by foreign governments/actors, and support to international terrorism. They do not have jurisdiction over general criminal matters, which are investigated by the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID).[3][4] In other branches of the U.S. military, both general criminal and counterintelligence investigations are performed by the same entity, as seen with AFOSI and NCIS who are also identified as "Defense Criminal Investigative Organizations."[5] The Army continues to keep these investigative activities separate via ACI and CID, although parallel and joint investigations happen periodically between these two U.S. Army agencies. Most operational ACI Special Agents today work under the auspices of the United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) with the US Army Counterintelligence Command (USACIC) responsible for CI activities and operating field offices within the continental United States. Outside the continental U.S., the 500th Military Intelligence Brigade provides the same type of support in Hawaii and Japan, the 501st Military Intelligence Brigade supports South Korea, and the 66th Military Intelligence Brigade does so in Europe. The 470th Military Intelligence Brigade covers South America, the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade covers the greater Middle East, and the 650th Military Intelligence Group[6] covers NATO missions in applicable countries. Other U.S. Army elements also have CI agents assigned to provide direct support such as those found within the various elements of Special Operations. History Prior to World War I, the U.S. military had no standing counterintelligence services, requiring the use of other elements to conduct counterintelligence activities, such as the Culper Spy Ring during the American Revolution, and by Allan Pinkerton and his private detectives during the U.S. Civil War.[7] ACI was formed as a standing CI service in 1917 during World War I, as the Corps of Intelligence Police under the newly created Military Intelligence Division commanded by Colonel Ralph Van Deman. Later, it was renamed and reformed as the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) during World War II and the Cold War. In the early 1970's, following the disbanding of the CIC, ACI was completely restructured as a result of intelligence reform. ACI agents were placed under the control of different military intelligence organizations that followed into the present day under INSCOM. Special Agent duties ACI Special Agent duties include the investigation of national security crimes using special investigative procedures, conducting counterintelligence operations, processing intelligence evidence, conducting both surveillance and counter-surveillance activities, protecting sensitive technologies, preparing and distributing reports, conducting source/informant operations, debriefing personnel for counterintelligence collections, and supporting counter-terrorism operations. Senior ACI Special Agents provide guidance to junior Special Agents and supervise their training; conduct liaison and operational coordination with foreign and U.S. law enforcement, security, and intelligence agencies; plan and conduct counterintelligence operations/activities related to national security; conduct high-profile counterintelligence collection activities and source operations ranging from overt to clandestine collection; supervise/manage surveillance operations; provide support for counterintelligence analytical products, to include preparing counterintelligence reports, estimates, and vulnerability assessments; and with additional training, may conduct technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM), credibility assessment examinations, or exploit cyber threats. Some ACI Special Agents are also cross-sworn and assigned to various federal task forces, such as the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force in regions of the U.S. where the U.S. Army or DoD has significant assets to protect against terrorist threats. Senior ACI Special Agents are also often assigned to U.S. Army Special Forces groups to assist with liaison, source operations, and intelligence investigations (typically in support of force protection); while also working closely with other intelligence collectors. These "Special Operations Forces (SOF)" CI Agents are granted the Enlisted Special Qualification Identifier (SQI) "S" or Officer Skill Code "K9" after successfully graduating from Airborne School, and after they have spent 12–24 months with a SOF unit; which may also require Agents complete additional unit level training and/or: Ranger School, SERE School, or applicable JSOU courses. While conducting operations in tactical environments, Army CI/HUMINT personnel often work in small teams called HUMINT Exploitation Teams (HET). HET's are designed to not only collect and report HUMINT information but to also exploit that intelligence information by acting on it. HET's also conduct Counterintelligence activities designed to deny, detect and deceive the enemy's ability to target friendly forces. Like their CID counterparts, ACI special agents are covered by the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA), and may apply for LEOSA credentials to carry a personal concealed firearm in any jurisdiction in the United States or United States Territories, regardless of state or local laws, with certain exceptions.[8] Functions of Counterintelligence Military and Civilian US Army Counterintelligence (CI) Special Agents receive their badge and credentials after graduation from the US Army CI Special Agent course in Fort Huachuca, Arizona. At his time, Army CI Special Agents are authorized, but not required, to attend the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center's (FLETC) Criminal Investigator Training Program (CITP) to function in most duty positions, with the exception of those agents assigned to FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF). Unlike the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) and Office of Special Investigations (OSI), the Army separates their criminal investigators into two separate components known as United States Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and Army Counterintelligence. Army CID is responsible for investigating the more traditional range of criminal activity that most people would associate with the job of a Special Agent. On the other hand, Army CI is responsible for criminal investigations related to National Security Crimes like espionage, terrorism, sabotage, subversion, sedition, and treason. The United States Coast Guard made the same decision when they established the Coast Guard Counterintelligence Service (CGCIS). The civilian counterparts for Army CID are classified as 1811's,[9] however the civilian counterparts for Army CI are classified as 0132's[10] who are predominately employed under the Military Intelligence Civilian Excepted Career Program (MICECP).[11] Investigations Investigation of National Security Crimes. Investigating the defection of Military personnel and DA Civilians overseas. Security Violations. Investigations involving AWOL/deserters and suicides involving someone with access to classified material. Operations CI Special Operations/National Foreign Counterintelligence Program. Offensive Counterintelligence Programs. CI Support to Force Protection. Collection Intelligence collection related to foreign intelligence service activities. Intelligence collection related to national security crimes. Write intelligence information reports. Intelligence debriefings. Analysis and Production CI analysis focusing on foreign intelligence and insider threat. CI threat and vulnerability assessments. CI studies of foreign intelligence services and insider threat. Functional Services CI Polygraph Program. Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM). Special Agent occupational codes Counterintelligence Special Agent Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) codes include: MOS Code Personnel Type Duty Title 35L Enlisted (E1 – E7) Counterintelligence Special Agent 35Y Senior Enlisted (E8 – E9) Chief Counterintelligence Sergeant 351L Warrant Officer (W1 – W5) Counterintelligence Technician 35A2E Commissioned Officer (O1 – O6) Counterintelligence Officer 0132 Civilian Intelligence Specialist (Special Agent & Supervisory Positions) The Army is planning to re-designate civilian agents from 0132[10] to a new 1800 series federal job code. The date for this change has not yet been determined. Selection and initial training Department of the Army Pamphlet 611-21 requires applicants for Counterintelligence be able to: Obtain a Top Secret security clearance with Sensitive Compartmented Information eligibility. A physical profile (PULHES) of 222221 or better. Be a minimum age of 21 after training for accreditation as a Special Agent. Be a minimum rank of E5/Sergeant after training for accreditation as a Special Agent. Possess an occupational specialty with a physical demands rating of medium. Have normal color vision. Have a minimum score of 101 in aptitude area ST on ASVAB tests administered on or after July 1, 2004.[12] Be a high school graduate or equivalent. Possess good voice quality and be able to speak English without an objectionable accent or impediment. Never been a member of the U.S. Peace Corps. No adverse information in military personnel, Provost Marshal, intelligence, or medical records which would prevent receiving a security clearance under AR 380-67 including no record of conviction by court-martial, or by a civilian court for any offense other than minor traffic violations. Must be interviewed per DA Pam 600-8, procedure 3-33 by a qualified Counterintelligence Special Agent. Must be a U.S. citizen. Must receive a command level recommendation for initial appointment. Must not have immediate family members or immediate family members of the Soldier's spouse who reside in a country within whose boundaries physical or mental coercion is known to be common practice. Have neither commercial nor vested interest in a country within whose boundaries physical or mental coercion is known to be a common practice against persons acting in the interest of the U.S. Must receive a waiver for any immediate family members who are not U.S. citizens. This occupation has recently been made an entry level Army position,[12] though many applicants are still drawn from the existing ranks. Becoming a credentialed Counterintelligence Special Agent requires successful completion of the Counterintelligence Special Agent Course (CISAC) at either Fort Huachuca, Arizona, or Camp Williams, Utah. Newly trained special agents are placed on a probationary status for the first year after graduation for active duty agents, and for the first two years after graduation for reserve/national guard agents. This allows for the removal of the Counterintelligence Special Agent MOS if the probationary Agent is deemed unfit for duty as a Special Agent.[1] Additional and advanced training Joint Counterintelligence Training Academy (JCITA): at Quantico, VA has numerous classified specialty and advanced counterintelligence courses for Special Agents of U.S. Army Counterintelligence, NCIS, OSI, and other agencies.[13] Defense Cyber Investigations Training Academy (DCITA): as with numerous other law enforcement and intelligence agencies, DCITA also trains U.S. Army Counterintelligence Special Agents to be cyber criminal investigators and computer forensic specialists to support various counterintelligence investigations, operations, and collections. Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC): As of 2017, U.S. Army Counterintelligence is an official partner organization with FLETC and began regularly sending agents through the Criminal Investigator Training Program (CITP), the same course attended by numerous other U.S. Federal Law Enforcement Agencies. Joint Special Operations University (JSOU): As with other special operations support occupations, Counterintelligence Special Agents assigned to special operations units have the opportunity to attend several courses through JSOU located near US SOCOM Headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base. Uniform and firearms ACI Active duty Special Agents within the United States are authorized to wear civilian business attire and may carry firearms in the performance of their investigative duties. In tactical and combat environments, they are authorized to wear the Army Combat Uniform, tactical civilian attire, or attire that supports the operational security of their mission. When agents wear the Army Combat Uniform they are authorized to replace rank insignia with Department of the Army Civilian "U.S." insignia. Given the broad range of CI activities, specific assignments will dictate what clothing is appropriate, which may be civilian attire local to the area of operation. Although agents may be issued other weapons on special assignments, they are generally assigned a standard Sig Sauer M18 compact pistol. For combat environments, special agents are also typically issued the M4 carbine. Notable U.S. Army Counterintelligence Special Agents Noel Behn[14] Philip J. Corso Luis Elizondo Jim Gilmore[15] Mike Gravel Clinton J. Hill Henry Kissinger[16] Arthur Komori Ann M. McDonough Edward T. McHale Ib Melchior[17] Nathan Safferstein Richard M. Sakakida J. D. Salinger William L. Uanna Isadore Zack[18] Nikko Ortiz In films and television The 1988 movie Hotel Terminus, is a documentary which chronicles the life of former German SS Officer Klaus Barbie, and partially depicts his time working for CIC after World War II. In the popular 1986-87 comic book series Watchmen and its later film adaptation, a character named Forbes is an Agent of U.S. Army Intelligence. In the 1981 George Lucas and Steven Spielberg movie Raiders of the Lost Ark starring Harrison Ford, Indiana Jones and his friend Marcus are briefed and sent on a mission by two CIP Special Agents to locate and recover the lost Ark of the Covenant before the Nazis can find it. In the 1975 movie The Imposter, an ex-Army intelligence agent is hired to impersonate a rich builder who has been marked for assassination. From 1973 to 1979, the television show MASH featured a recurring character named Colonel Samuel Flagg, who was likely a current or former CIC Agent. The 1972 TV movie Fireball Forward featured Ben Gazzara as a general placed in command of a "bad luck" division. He quickly determines there is a spy in the unit, giving the Germans the division plans just before each battle, resulting in defeat after defeat. The general contacts CIC major L.Q. Jones, who assigns CIC undercover agent Morgan Paull. The agent eventually finds the spy. This movie was a pilot for a series that was never made. In a 1965 episode of the television show The Lucy Show, starring Lucille Ball, titled, Lucy and the Undercover Agent, Lucy becomes convinced a mysterious person at a restaurant is an enemy spy when, in fact, he is an Army CI Agent who thinks Lucy is a spy. See also Other Military Department Counterintelligence Organizations Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI or OSI) Additional Defense Criminal Investigative Organizations United States Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) Additional Department of Defense Counterintelligence Entities (Non-Law Enforcement) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) Marine Corps Counterintelligence Non-DoD Federal Counterintelligence Investigative Organizations Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) Coast Guard Counterintelligence Service (CGCIS) Additional Information Federal law enforcement in the United States U.S. Army Special Forces List of United States Army MOS Historical U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps Historical U.S. Army Corps of Intelligence Police References United States Army Regulation 381-20, The Army Counterintelligence Program, May 25, 2010 DOD INSTRUCTION O-5240.10, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) IN THE DOD COMPONENTS, April 27, 2020 United States Army Techniques Publication 2-22.2-1, Counterintelligence Investigations, Counterintelligence Investigative Jurisdiction United States Army Regulation 195-2, Criminal Investigation Activities, June 9, 2014 DOD INSTRUCTION 5505.16, INVESTIGATIONS BY DOD COMPONENTS, June 23, 2017 https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/fm34-37_97/9-chap.htm Stockham, Braden (2017). The Expanded Application of Forensic Science and Law Enforcement Methodologies in Army Counterintelligence. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center. https://leosaonline.com/LEOSAUniversalApplicationv7.pdf[bare URL PDF] https://www.specialagents.org/ https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/classification-qualifications/classifying-general-schedule-positions/standards/0100/gs0132.pdf[bare URL PDF] "US Army Counterintelligence". "Counterintelligence Agent". "Joint Military Intelligence Training Center (JMITC)". "Noel Behn, 70, Novelist, Producer and Screenwriter". The New York Times. July 31, 1998. Retrieved August 18, 2015. "Member Profile: Mr. Jim Gilmore". Republican National Lawyers Association. Archived from the original on March 27, 2017. Retrieved September 30, 2012. Isaacson, Walter (September 27, 2005). Kissinger: A Biography. New York: Simon and Schuster. pp. 47–49. ISBN 9780743286978. Retrieved August 18, 2015. Colker, David (March 21, 2015). "Ib Melchior dies at 97; sci-fi filmmaker reset classic tales in space". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved August 18, 2015. "Isadore Zack; intelligence work led to fight for justice". Boston Globe. May 11, 2011. Retrieved August 18, 2015.