Lesson of Afghanistan is that American Presidents Had No Moral or Constitutional or Legal Authority

Lesson of Afghanistan is that American Presidents Had No Moral or Constitutional or Legal Authority
Bodyguard of Lies
R 2025 Documentary ‧ 1h 30m

This is a very important conversation regarding the General Wesley Clark Seven Countries in Five Years Kill List that has now expanded to over 20 countries. Russia became No. 8 on the list.

Bodyguard of Lies Movie Review
Common Sense Media
https://www.commonsensemedia.org › movie-reviews
Sep 9, 2025 — Parents need to know that Bodyguard of Lies is a documentary that reveals difficult truths about US military and government deception of the ...

What does Judge Andrew Napolitano American retired jurist say about the failure of the American war in Afghanistan?

Google AI Overview

Based on his writings and commentary, Judge Andrew Napolitano attributes the failure of the American war in Afghanistan to its constitutional illegitimacy from the start. He views the entire intervention as a project of American hubris and empire-building, rather than a legitimate act of self-defense.

Constitutional and legal failings
Lack of authority: Napolitano argues that American presidents lacked the moral, constitutional, and legal authority to send troops to Afghanistan in the first place. He contends that the mission was an unconstitutional war, and therefore destined for failure.

Expansion of power: He criticizes the use of the 2001 "Authorization for Use of Military Force" (AUMF), calling it a "creature unknown to the Constitution". Napolitano notes that its broad and ambiguous wording allowed any president to use military force "at any time against any person or entity who perpetrated, facilitated or supported the 9/11 attacks".

Pretext for empire: The war was not a legitimate response in self-defense, but rather a pretext for the U.S. to build an empire around the globe.

Critique of the 2021 withdrawal
Continuation of past failures: While commenting on the chaotic withdrawal in 2021, Napolitano suggests that President Biden's execution of the pullout triggered an "abrupt" exit. However, he emphasizes that the withdrawal's problems were rooted in 20 years of flawed policy and occupation, rather than the specific actions of the Biden administration.

Shift in focus: Napolitano observes that American media outlets focused on the poor execution of the 2021 withdrawal to avoid discussing how the policy of a continuous U.S. presence had been for nothing. He further argues that the withdrawal was the result of a deal with the Taliban that former President Trump had agreed to.

American hubris and empire-building
Unconstitutional action: In a 2023 opinion piece, Napolitano states that the "lesson of Afghanistan is that American presidents had no moral or constitutional or legal authority to send troops and dollars and assets there in the first place".

Justification for killing: He believes that the U.S. has a pattern of using military force for empire-building, claiming the authority to "kill any foe — real or imagined." Napolitano sees this as a violation of natural law, arguing that "killing for empire is not in self-defense".

Obama-Era Afghanistan War Surge Debated
U.S. Senate (.gov)
https://www.afghanistanwarcommission.senate.gov › ob...
Jun 23, 2025 — ... Afghan people would have the future they deserved,” he said. “For why we failed there is no simple, easily identifiable answer. There is no ...

Google AI Overview

The Afghanistan War Commission has concluded that the American war failed due to a combination of deep-seated strategic errors, policy inconsistencies, and a fundamental misunderstanding of the local context. The commission's final report is due in August 2026, but interim reports and public hearings have outlined the emerging themes and conclusions.

Strategic-level failures
Expansion of mission: The war's purpose expanded almost immediately from a narrow counterterrorism objective to an ambitious and ultimately unachievable nation-building and reconstruction effort.

Influence of Iraq: Early strategy was compromised by the contemporaneous planning and diversion of resources to the Iraq War, which was described by one commissioner as the "enormous elephant in the room".

Execution over strategy: Strategic-level decisions were made with immense energy, but too little attention was paid to how those policies were being executed on the ground in Afghanistan, leading to a profound disconnect.

Inconsistent and misguided policies
Ignored Afghan context: Policymakers repeatedly ignored the political and cultural realities on the ground, failing to understand or adapt to the complexities of Afghan society, its tribal structures, and the role of Islam.
Fueling corruption: The large influx of American money for development and reconstruction often bypassed local authorities and fueled corruption. This undermined Afghan institutions and pushed citizens toward the anti-government Taliban.

Reliance on parallel systems: American contractors and agencies created parallel systems that bypassed local Afghan authorities. This undermined Afghan sovereignty and prevented its institutions, including security forces, from becoming self-reliant.

Military and operational problems
Afghan forces' dependency: U.S. officials trained Afghan forces to be overly dependent on American logistics, technology, and support. As U.S. aid declined, the Afghan military's capacity collapsed, paving the way for the swift Taliban takeover.

Lack of continuity: The U.S. military suffered from a "lack of leadership continuity," with commanding officers serving short tours of duty that prevented a deep institutional memory from developing. This was described as "the institutional equivalent of a frontal lobotomy".
Ignoring a double game: The commission highlighted Pakistan's "double game," where it provided vital assistance to the U.S. while simultaneously providing a sanctuary for the Taliban and undermining counterterrorism efforts.

Failed diplomacy and negotiations
Delayed peace talks: The commission found that negotiations with the Taliban began too late, after the U.S. had already lost crucial leverage. The peace talks were also initiated at a time when Afghan institutions were dangerously dependent on U.S. support, leading to a rapid decline in their capabilities.

A systemic, multi-layered failure
The commission has stressed that there is "no simple, easily identifiable answer" or a single villain for the war's failure. Instead, it was a "systemic failure of many organizations and the collective failure of many individuals". The findings emphasize that the outcome was not due to tactical shortcomings by troops but rather the culmination of high-level strategic errors, ignored intelligence, and a failure to account for complex local dynamics over two decades.

Join the Weekly Video Call
constitutionhelp.com