Col Doug Macgregor: U.S. Built for Offensive Warfare Everywhere - A LOSING STRATEGY

Col Doug Macgregor: U.S. Built for Offensive Warfare Everywhere - A LOSING STRATEGY

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7KCFDVhTQb8

DOUG's DEFENSE PAPER: TAMING THE WARFARE STATE
https://theological-geography.net/wp-...

Col Doug Macgregor warns U.S. forces are overstretched and faces the real risk of three simultaneous major conflicts: Ukraine, the Middle East, and a potential crisis in Venezuela — which could spark wider Latin American opposition.

Current posture is criticized: we’re spending more without changing force structure, keeping outdated equipment and too many forward-deployed forces that become easy targets in high-end war.

The Secretary’s plan to cut general/officer ranks is insufficiently explained — trimming leaders isn’t a strategy unless tied to a clear, governing grand strategy and structural changes.

The speaker calls for a new grand strategy whose core proposals include:

“Defend America first” — prioritize Western Hemisphere, U.S. territory, borders, coastal waters and airspace; avoid the use of force unless vital interests or territory are directly attacked.

Scale back overseas presence (reassess ~800 bases) and keep only the bases needed to protect critical lines of communication and strategic interests.

Adopt a no-first-use nuclear posture.

Create a stronger national operational / chief of defense (a real general staff with merit-based promotion, examinations, and authority) to replace the current weaker chairman role.

Invest in a 21st-century force through experimentation and new force design rather than incremental tweaks to Cold-War-era structures.

Force-design priorities: shift investment toward Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR), long/medium-range strike, and integrated air defenses (including North America’s homeland defenses). Maneuver forces should operate under an ISR-strike umbrella rather than relying on large overseas massed deployments.

Ukraine’s war is presented as validation of the ISR–strike model: massed formations are now highly vulnerable to persistent surveillance and long-range strikes. AI and robotics will only accelerate that trend.

Practical points: meaningful change requires time and real experimentation (isolated units given new tech and command authorities), and a decade-scale effort to redesign forces and doctrine.